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Abstract 
Most communication in the modern era takes place over some type of cyber 
network, to include telecommunications, banking, stock exchanges, vehicular traffic 
flow, public utilities, health systems, and social networking to name a few. Information 
gained from illegitimate network access can be used to create catastrophic effects at the 
individual, corporate, national, and even international levels, making cyber security a top 
priority.  
Cyber networks frequently encounter amounts of network traffic too large to 
process real-time threat detection efficiently. Reducing the amount of information 
necessary for a network monitor to determine the presence of a threat would likely aide in 
keeping networks more secure.     
This thesis uses network traffic data captured during the Department of Defense 
Cyber Defense Exercise to determine which features of network traffic are salient to 
detecting and classifying threats. After generating a set of 248 features from the capture 
data, feed-forward artificial neural networks were generated and signal-to-noise ratios 
were used to prune the feature set to 18 features while still achieving an accuracy ranging 
from 83% - 97% for the testing/training sets and 63% - 88% for the validation sets. The 
salient features primarily come from the transport layer section of the network traffic data 
and involve the client/server connection parameters, size of the initial data sent, and 
number of segments and/or bytes sent in the flow. 
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1 
SALIENT FEATURE SELECTION USING FEED-FORWARD NEURAL 
NETWORKS AND SIGNAL-TO-NOISE RATIOS WITH A FOCUS TOWARD 
NETWORK THREAT DETECTION AND CLASSIFICATION 
I. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
The integration of cyber technologies into nearly all aspects of our everyday lives 
makes cyber security a serious concern. Cyber security has been defined as a 
“complicated and complex subject encompassing computer security, information 
assurance, comprehensive infrastructure protection, commercial integrity, and ubiquitous 
personal interactions” [1].  Most communication in the modern era takes place over some 
type of cyber network, to include telecommunications, banking, stock exchanges, 
vehicular traffic flow, public utilities, health systems, and social networking to name a 
few. Information gained from illegitimate network access can be used to create 
catastrophic effects at the individual, corporate, national, and even international levels. 
The same could be said for successfully executed attacks against those networks. The 
number of cyber attacks on Department of Defense (DoD) and other United States (US) 
Government networks is estimated to be 400 million annually [2]. A study published by 
McAfee Security suggests US losses due to cyber attacks may reach $100 billion per year 
[3].  Cyber security has become important enough to be listed as one of the five central 
missions of the Department of Homeland Security [4] and FBI officials speculate cyber 
attacks will surpass terrorism as a domestic danger over the next ten years [5].  
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1.2. Research Goal and Objectives 
An important aspect of cyber security is threat detection and classification. The 
aspect of cyber security chosen for this research is computer network traffic.  Computer 
network traffic encompasses a massive amount of information. While all of that 
information can be captured fairly easily (digital storage space is relatively cheap), 
analysis of the information is a time and resource intensive process. The issue becomes 
how to sort through the information to determine what is a threat and what is not.  
The purpose of this research is to reduce network traffic data into the parts, or 
features, salient to threat detection and classification. The inspiration for this thesis comes 
from Moore et al. [6], a research study conducted in 2005, to develop a set of features to 
assess classification performance on general network traffic data. The outcome of the 
study was a list of 248 features based on packet or flow data. After generating a dataset 
consisting of those 248 features from a collection of known network attack data, this 
thesis attempts to determine which of the features are most important to determining 
whether or not a threat exists. 
1.3. Assumptions and Limitations 
One of the challenges faced when attempting to classify computer network threats 
is acquiring the truth data. The people with malicious intent toward a network are 
unlikely to give away information on their exploits making it difficult to label threats. 
The data used for this research came without truth data making it necessary to derive a 
way to create labels for each observation. The method used for this label creation is 
discussed in Chapter III; it is assumed the observations using this method are labeled 
accurately.  
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1.4. Implications 
Much research has gone into defining the salient features for general traffic 
classification, some of which will be discussed in Chapter II. The research in this thesis 
intends to narrow that focus down, specifically targeting threat detection and 
classification. The hope is that most of the data will be unnecessary and can be 
disregarded while still capturing the pertinent information. Ideally, this would be done in 
real-time with a network sensor that monitors incoming traffic and extracts only the data 
necessary for detecting and classifying threats. Successful reduction of the dataset 
required for analysis, along with knowledge of what components of the network traffic to 
focus on, should noticeably speed up the threat detection process and potentially enable a 
more secure computer network.  
1.5. Preview  
 Chapter II presents previous work done in the areas of general network traffic and 
network threat detection classification. It also includes a discussion of the use of neural 
networks for classification and the use of the signal-to-noise ratio as a saliency measure. 
Chapter III describes the methodologies used in experimentation of the datasets including 
the work involved in preprocessing the data for analysis. Chapter IV explores the results 
and analysis from the experimentation done with the data. Finally, Chapter V discusses 
the conclusions developed from the results in Chapter IV and offers thoughts on future 
research of this topic.
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II. Literature Review 
2.1. Chapter Overview 
 With the explosion of computer networks and internet usage across the world in 
the last 15 to 20 years, methodologies to better understand and classify internet traffic 
have become a hot research topic for a multitude of reasons. This chapter provides a 
summary of previous work done relevant to the research presented in this thesis and is 
organized as follows. The first section attempts to define some of the more common 
terms and concepts to help the reader better understand the typical technical jargon. Next, 
we will examine research in the areas of general internet traffic classification methods to 
gain some insight into the overarching methodologies, and then focus in on the sub-field 
of network intrusion detection classification methods, which relates directly to the 
research in this thesis. Finally, we will consider research done on the importance of 
feature selection to accurate classification, and, while there are many methods to handle 
feature selection, we will focus in on using neural networks, leading up to the method 
used in this thesis.  
2.2. Background Information 
The research in this thesis attempts to merge together two distinct, yet related, 
academic fields, operations research (OR) and cyber operations (specifically computer 
networks). As such, terminology and concepts may be used differently between the two. 
Because this is an OR-based thesis, this section is an attempt to bridge the gap between 
the two academic fields, making it easier for the OR-based reader to better understand 
both the reviewed research and the research presented in this thesis. We will begin by 
defining some of the more commonly used terminology and concepts to provide a 
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baseline understanding. Next is a brief discussion of the currently used TCP/IP model 
used for describing how computer networks work. An acronym list can be found in 
Appendix A: Acronym List.  
2.2.1. Terminology and Concepts 
 The following are explanations of terminology and concepts seen throughout the 
reviewed literature and the research done for this thesis. Most of the definitions come 
from Technopedia.com [7], although a few are derived from experience or noted sources. 
 Audit: an examination of a computer network’s traffic logs or administrative 
policies and procedures [8]. 
 Bandwidth: broad term defined as the bit-rate measure of the transmission 
capacity over a network communication system. Bandwidth is also described as 
the carrying capacity of a channel or the data transfer speed of that channel. 
However, broadly defined, bandwidth is the capacity of a network. Bandwidth 
exists in both the wired and wireless communication networks. 
 Client: can be a simple application or a whole system that accesses services being 
provided by a server; most often located on another system or computer, which 
can be accessed via a network. 
 Client/Server Architecture: a computing model, in which the server hosts, delivers 
and manages most of the resources and services to be consumed by the client. 
This type of architecture has one or more client computers connected to a central 
server over a network or Internet connection. This system shares computing 
resources. 
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 Computer Networks: a group of computer systems and other computing hardware 
devices that are linked together through communication channels to facilitate 
communication and resource-sharing among a wide range of users. 
 Encryption: the process of using an algorithm to transform information to make it 
unreadable for unauthorized users. 
 Firewalls: software, hardware, or a combination of both, used to maintain the 
security of a private network. Firewalls block unauthorized access to or from 
private networks and are often employed to prevent unauthorized Web users or 
illicit software from gaining access to private networks connected to the Internet. 
 Flows: one or more packets between a pair of hosts, defined by a 5-tuple, made 
up of source and destination IP addresses, source and destination port numbers, 
and the protocol type (TCP, UDP) used for communication.  
 Header: the initial set of bits in a packet transmitted by an end device that 
describes what the receiving end device can expect to receive throughout the data 
stream. 
 Hosts: end systems, sometimes referred to as clients or servers [9]. 
 Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP): an application-layer protocol used primarily 
on the World Wide Web. HTTP uses a client-server model where the web 
browser is the client and communicates with the webserver that hosts the website. 
The browser uses HTTP, which is carried over TCP/IP to communicate to the 
server and retrieve Web content for the user. 
 Internet Protocol (IP): protocol that specifies the format of the packets sent and 
received among routers and end systems [9]. One of the two most important 
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protocols in the Internet; all internet components with network layers must use IP. 
The most common version is IPv4, although IPv6 may take over in the future. 
IPv4 is a connectionless protocol providing the logical connection between 
network devices by providing identification for each device [7]. 
 Layer: a logical grouping of similar functions; used in networking to distinguish 
the communication functions associated with computer networks [10]. 
 Network Planning and Resource Provisioning: analyzing network traffic/behavior 
to allocate resources to optimize prioritization and performance. 
 Network Security Monitoring: a computer network's systematic effort to detect, 
deter and track unauthorized access, exploitation, modification, or denial of the 
network and network resources. 
 Network Traffic: the flow of data across a computer network. 
 Offline vs. Online: online refers to analysis or classification done in real-time or 
near real-time while the system is monitoring the network and collecting data; 
offline refers to analyzing or classifying data that has already been collected.  
 Packet: a single network communication data unit containing fixed or variable 
lengths, and may contain three portions: header, body and trailer. 
 Payload: the raw data a packet carries.  
 Ports: process-specific or application-specific software construct serving as a 
communication endpoint. A specific network port is identified by its number 
commonly referred to as port number, the IP address in which the port is 
associated with and the type of transport protocol used for the communication. 
Any networking process or device uses a specific network port to transmit and 
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receive data. This means that it listens for incoming packets whose destination 
port matches that port number, and/or transmits outgoing packets whose source 
port is set to that port number. Processes may use multiple network ports to 
receive and send data. 
 Protocols: a set of rules and guidelines for communicating data. Rules are defined 
for each step and process during communication between two or more computers. 
Networks have to follow these rules to successfully transmit data. 
 Routers: a device that analyzes the contents of data packets transmitted within a 
network or to another network. Routers determine whether the source and 
destination are on the same network or whether data must be transferred from one 
network type to another, which requires encapsulating the data packet with 
routing protocol header information for the new network type. 
 Quality of Service (QoS): refers to a network’s ability to achieve maximum 
bandwidth and deal with other network performance elements like latency, error 
rate and uptime. Quality of service also involves controlling and managing 
network resources by setting priorities for specific types of data (video, audio, 
files) on the network. 
 Server: a computer or computer program that manages access to a centralized 
resource or service in a network [11]. 
 Three-Way Handshake: a method used in a TCP/IP network to create a 
connection between a local host/client and server. It is a three-step method that 
requires both the client and server to exchange SYN (synchronization), 
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SYN/ACK, and ACK (acknowledgment) packets before actual data 
communication begin. 
 Transmission Control Protocol (TCP): a network communication protocol 
designed to send data packets over the Internet. The other of the two most 
important protocols in the internet. TCP is a transport layer protocol used to create 
a connection between remote computers by transporting and ensuring the delivery 
of messages over supporting networks and the Internet. TCP works in 
collaboration with IP, which defines the logical location of the remote node, 
whereas TCP transports and ensures that the data is delivered to the correct 
destination. Before transmitting data, TCP creates a connection between the 
source and destination node and keeps it live until the communication is active. 
TCP breaks large data into smaller packets and also ensures that the data integrity 
is intact once it is reassembled at the destination node 
 Tunneling: a protocol enabling the secure movement of data from one network to 
another. Tunneling uses an encapsulation process to make data packets appear as 
though they are of a public nature to a public network when they are actually 
private data packets, allowing them to pass through unnoticed. Examples of 
tunneling include Virtual Private Networks (VPN) and Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol (HTTP). 
 User Datagram Protocol (UDP): transport layer protocol for client- server 
network applications. UDP does not employ handshaking dialogs for reliability, 
ordering and data integrity. The protocol assumes that error-checking and 
correction is not required, thus avoiding processing at the network interface level. 
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UDP is widely used in video conferencing, real-time computer games, and data 
streaming. The protocol permits individual packets to be dropped or received in a 
different order than that in which they were sent, allowing for better performance. 
 Webserver: a system that delivers content or services to end users over the 
Internet. A Web server consists of a physical server, server operating system (OS) 
and software used to facilitate HTTP communication. 
2.2.2. TCP/IP Model 
 In 1984 the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Model was published by the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) to provide a conceptual model that 
defines networking standards for hardware and software technology development and 
how networking protocols should work [10]. As can be seen in Figure 2.1, the model 
breaks down similar functions into logical (the ways the functions act as opposed to 
physical placement) layers. The more currently used model, the TCP/IP model, was 
developed after the OSI Model around the TCP/IP protocols, what we now call the 
internet [12]. The TCP/IP model essentially combines layers from the OSI model into 
broader categories more appropriate to current computer networking. The model is 
sometimes seen with five layers (separating the network access layer into the data link 
and physical layer). The most pertinent information for the reader to know is that the 
research for this thesis is focused mostly in the transport layer which handles end-to-end 
connections, and is the same in both modes, with some interaction in the internet/network 
layer. 
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Figure 2.1: OSI vs. TCP/IP Model [13] 
2.3. General Internet Traffic Classification Methods 
 Network intrusion detection classification is a subset of general internet traffic 
classification and, as such, the overall classification process and its methodologies are the 
building blocks for the techniques used in intrusion detection classification. General 
traffic classification is imperative in network planning estimation and resource 
provisioning, security monitoring and auditing, and Quality of Service (QoS) 
measurements. Classification methods discussed here include transport layer port analysis 
and payload inspection (signature rule-based matching), machine learning with both 
unsupervised and supervised algorithms, and a few other, uncategorized methods. Many 
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of the techniques discussed here can also be found in surveys done by Nguyen and 
Armitage [14] and Dainotti et al. [15].  
2.3.1. Port Analysis and Signature-Based Methods 
Classifying network applications based on well-known port numbers is 
considered by some as the simplest, and fastest, method of classification, as long the 
classification accuracy is not vital [15]. Moore and Papagiannaki [16] explain that, as 
technology and user skills have developed and adapted, well-known port numbers are no 
longer reliable for use in classification. This is due mainly to internet applications being 
designed to use other than standard port numbers, dynamic port selection, or protocols as 
wrappers to slip through security systems, like firewalls, unnoticed. Moore and 
Papagiannaki show this change in design leads to a low accuracy classification (50% - 
70%) of network traffic when using port-based classification from the Internet Assigned 
Numbers Authority (IANA) list [17]. The authors present a classification technique using 
a content-based (payload) methodology. This classification technique examines and 
interprets the contents of the packet’s payload iterating through nine methods including 
port-based classification, packet header information, single packet signatures, single 
packet protocols, first kilobyte signatures, first kilobyte protocols, selected flow 
protocols, all flow protocols, and host history. Each method is applied sequentially until 
the required classification certainty has been reached. While this technique achieves an 
impressive overall average accuracy of 98%, it is obviously quite labor intensive. 
Roughan et al. [18] suggest classifying network traffic through the use of 
statistical application signatures. These signatures are derived from the manner in which 
the applications are used, forming a set of classification rules based on port numbers or IP 
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addresses, and are intended to be insensitive to the particular application layer protocols. 
The technique first calculates connection statistics offline, using those results to classify 
the traffic, then creates rules for the online classifier to use. Nearest Neighbor and Linear 
Discriminant Analysis were the two methods used for classification. Using trial-and-
error, the authors selected up to four features to classify the data across four to seven 
application classes. Although encouraging, because their analysis is restricted to broadly 
defined classes, the authors limit their resulting low error rates (5% - 8%) to wide-
ranging properties found in many applications, meaning the classification method will be 
insufficient for identifying specific applications.  
Haffner et al. [19] proposes using application-level information taken from 
packets to match with common application signatures. Three machine learning (ML) 
classifiers are used to derive the application signatures for several network applications – 
Naïve Bayes, AdaBoost, and Maximum Entropy. The classifier intends to be insensitive 
to port numbers, alterations of network characteristics, and communication pattern 
changes. This method of matching application signatures does, however, require frequent 
updating because the application signatures are dynamic and may change over time with 
application and protocol evolvement. The AdaBoost algorithm results in the best 
classification performance (greater than 99%); the authors suggest this may be due to the 
extremely low noise level in the data because of the way it was generated. The research 
also considered early classification resulting in the conclusion that only the first 64 bytes 
of each flow is necessary for application identification. Finally, the authors test the 
derived signatures against data captured seven months later, finding only a slight increase 
in the error rate, demonstrating the durability of the signatures over time. 
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2.3.2. Machine Learning (ML) Methods 
 There are two standard categories of machine learning methods: Unsupervised 
and Supervised. Unsupervised learning means the correct classification labels are not 
provided with the data [20]. The underlying structure of the data is examined, looking for 
correlations in the data to discern patterns, which are then organized into categories. 
Supervised learning requires the correct classification labels with the data. Weights are 
then used to help the generated network achieve classification as close to the correct 
answers as possible. The next few sections discuss clustering, a type of unsupervised 
machine learning, and several different types of supervised machine learning methods. 
2.3.2.1. Unsupervised Machine Learning Methods 
Obstacles such as privacy information, encryption, and protocol tunneling 
(encapsulation) have made it difficult, if not impossible, to inspect the payload, or data, 
carried in the packets across a network. This, along with increased complexity and 
processing overhead, has moved the focus of classification techniques away from payload 
inspection and introduced the concept of ML, incorporating unsupervised and supervised 
algorithms [15]. This section discusses different uses of the unsupervised ML algorithm 
referred to as clustering.  
McGregor et al. [21] propose the probabilistic Expectation Maximization (EM) 
algorithm to designate flows into clusters based on a fixed set of traffic flow statistics. 
This classifier looks for similar properties but provides no explanation as to why the 
applications are grouped the way they are; it may, however, provide some insight with 
previously unclassified, unknown traffic [22]. McGregor et al. [21] conclude their 
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clustering technique, at this point, is too general to classify individual applications and 
new attributes must be developed to illuminate distinctions between those applications.  
Zander et al. [23] use AutoClass, a Bayesian clustering algorithm based on EM, in 
their approach to traffic classification. The feature selection technique for their 
methodology is based on the classification performance of the AutoClass algorithm. 
Using sequential forward selection (SFS), also called stepwise selection, features are 
added one at a time until the best performing combination is derived. The authors 
calculate the homogeneity of the classes, illustrating how an application with a higher 
homogeneity is more likely to be separated because its characteristics are dissimilar to the 
other applications. One issue with this classification methodology is that some 
applications, such as FTP, Telnet, and Web traffic, overlap each other or have a wide 
range of characteristics thus making them difficult to separate into classes. While the 
average classification accuracy of this technique over all given applications is 86.5%, this 
diversity of characteristics results in a false positive rate of up to 40%, depending on the 
application. 
Unsupervised clustering is also used by Erman et al. [24] for traffic classification, 
this time comparing the K-Means (partition-based) and DBSCAN (density-based) 
algorithms with the previously used AutoClass (probabilistic model-based) algorithm. 
While the DBSCAN algorithm results in a lower overall average classification accuracy 
(75%) than K-Means and AutoClass (both greater than 85%), it is noted that DBSCAN’s 
clusters are more accurately formed. The model building time of the two newer 
algorithms (K-Means, one minute; DBSCAN, three minutes) demonstrates a significant 
difference when compared with the old (AutoClass, four and a half hours). This research 
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suggests the K-Means algorithm as the best option because of its high classification 
accuracy and low model building time. 
Bernaille et al. [25] focus on analyzing only the first five packets of the TCP flow 
in an attempt to develop an online, near real-time classifier. Offline traces are used to 
train the classifier based on the size of the data packets using Euclidean distance. K-
Means clustering is used to find natural clusters in the data, chosen because this method 
does not rely on previously defined classes. This lack of reliance allows for applications 
with multiple behaviors to be modeled separately. The description and composition of 
each cluster determine how the online classifier identifies the traffic flow. This method 
achieves an average accuracy of greater than 80% for the flows tested. One potentially 
serious limitation exists with this online classifier, however, if the network monitor uses 
packet sampling instead of complete packet capture because the technique requires the 
first five packets of the flow. 
2.3.2.2. Supervised Machine Learning Methods 
This section discusses several Supervised ML algorithms and their application to 
internet traffic classification. These techniques include Naïve Bayes (NB), C4.5 Decision 
Tree (C4.5), k-Nearest Neighbor (kNN), Support Vector Machines, and Neural networks.  
Moore and Zuev [22] demonstrate internet traffic classification through the NB 
method, both with and without kernel density estimation. Kernel density estimation is a 
non-parametric (infinite-dimensional) method of estimating the probability density 
function [26]. Feature selection is addressed in this research by use of the Fast 
Correlation-Based Filter (FCBF) [22]. Straight NB resulted in an average classification 
accuracy of 65.26%; using FCBF pre-filtering brought that value up to an average of 
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94.29%. NB with kernel density estimation demonstrated an average accuracy of 93.5%, 
with an increase to average of 96.29% after using FCBF pre-filtering. The experiment 
was repeated with data from approximately 12 months after the initial data set resulting in 
a severe drop in classification accuracy for the NB method with an overall average 
accuracy of 20.75% without kernel estimation and 37.65% with kernel estimation. Using 
the FCBF pre-filtering brings those values up to 93.38% and 93.73%, respectively, 
demonstrating the value of the dimension reduction of the features used for analysis.  
Williams et al. [27] compared five ML algorithms for internet traffic classification 
on the basis of both classification accuracy and computational performance. The authors 
illustrated how classification accuracies can be very similar between the different 
algorithms while computational performance can be significantly different; this is very 
important when considering real-time analysis. The five supervised machine learning 
algorithms analyzed were NB (both discretisation (NBD) and kernel density estimation 
(NBK)), C4.5, Bayesian Network (BayesNet), and Naïve Bayes Tree (NBTree). The 
same ‘full feature set’ (containing 22 features) is used for each ML algorithm tested. 
Consistency-based (CON) and Correlation-based (CFS) algorithms are then used for 
feature selection or reduction and the tests are re-run for comparison. There is little 
change in the classification accuracy (2 – 2.5%) across the five algorithms tested when 
comparing the full and reduced feature sets. NBK is the only algorithm not at or above 
the 95% accuracy level (~80%). With computational performance C4.5 has the fastest 
classification speed, with NBK the slowest, and NBK has the fastest build time, with 
NBTree the slowest.  
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Zhang et al. [28] take the NB method a step further by using it in combination 
with a bag-of-flows (BoF), or a correlated grouping of flows occurring in the same time 
period. The BoF concept allows for the correlated flows to be aggregated which, when 
used in concert with the NB algorithm and a set of combination decision rules (sum, 
maximum, median, and majority), create a set of posterior probabilities used for class 
prediction. Referred to as BoF-NB, the proposed classification method is then compared 
to four other classification methods including C4.5, k-Nearest Neighbor (k-NN), NB, and 
a semi-supervised method proposed by Erman et al. [29]. Six out of the original 20 
features are selected through CFS. Results demonstrate the BoF-NB performed, in 
general, as good as or better than the other methods tested with an overall average 
accuracy of 88% to 94%, depending on the data set chosen. The authors believe the better 
performance is because the BoF-NB’s effective use of the flow correlation information. 
Huang et al. [30] suggested using k-NN in their classification model. To achieve 
the best classification results the authors select 10 features and 6 classes, based on 
performance of the classifier. Mahalanobis, in contrast to Euclidean, distance was used to 
measure the distance between the data samples. This research focused on the change in 
classification accuracy as additional classes were added, allowing for finer grained 
classification. Using only three of the classes results in classification accuracies of greater 
than 99%; however, once the additional three classes are added in, classification 
accuracies drop as low as 46%. According to the authors, these results occur because the 
selected classes have similar statistical features and, with the selected features, the 
correlation between the classes is not taken into consideration.  
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In an extension of [22], Auld et al. [31] demonstrated a traffic classifier using 
supervised ML based on Bayesian trained neural networks without source or destination 
host address or port information, enabling classification of anonymized or encrypted 
packet headers. Unlike [22], the classification methodology does not assume 
independence between the discriminators, allowing for a more robust and useful 
classifier. This experiment consists of data collected from 2 24-hour periods separated by 
8 months and focuses solely on TCP flows (i.e., ignores UDP, ICMP, etc.). Multilayer 
perceptron classification networks, containing one hidden layer with 10 nodes and 
Bayesian-inferred weights, assign classification probabilities to the traffic flows using 
246 features as inputs. This research used the hyperbolic tangent function as the 
activation function to model nonlinearities. Using the neural networks, the experiments 
resulted in an average classification of greater than 99% for the first data collection 
period and 95% for the second. Comparisons are also studied in consideration of the data 
sizes of the different classes of traffic and its effect on accuracy.  
Expanding upon both [22] and [31], Zhou et al. [32] propose a traffic 
classification technique using feed-forward neural networks trained through Bayesian 
regularization and compare its results to the NB classifier subject to the Gaussian 
distribution assumption. The neural networks used for this research are set up very 
similarly to those in [31] with a single hidden layer containing 10 neurons. Results of the 
experimentation demonstrate the feed-forward neural networks, with an average overall 
accuracy of about 95%, perform better than the NB classifier, with an average overall 
accuracy of about 75%, and are more stable. The authors argue the NB classifier’s poor 
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performance is due to a misrepresentation of the traffic flow properties because of the 
Gaussian distribution assumption. 
Much of the internet traffic classification research focuses on offline classification 
due to heavy processing overhead and potential bandwidth limitations. Li and Moore [33] 
propose an online, near-real time, classification system using packet-header based 
behavioral features and C4.5. This technique requires only information readily available 
to internet routers without reliance on port numbers or payload inspections and enables 
examination of latency and throughput of the monitoring system. Because this 
methodology is designed to be near real-time, the approach capitalizes on features pulled 
from only an initial few packets (5 – 10), as opposed to those based on entire flows. A 
CFS method was used for feature dimension reduction leading to a selection of 12 
features. C4.5 averaged an overall average classification accuracy of 99.834%. This 
research also shows, for this methodology, using part of the traffic flow, instead of the 
entire flow, does not reduce the classification accuracy. 
Based on a trial-and-error approach, Tabatabaei et al. [34] choose seven as the 
necessary number of packets required for online traffic classification comparing Support 
Vector Machines (SVM) and k-NN techniques. SVM is typically used as a binary 
classifier so several binary classifiers are combined to create a multi-category SVM 
focusing on “fuzzy” one-against all and “fuzzy” pairwise techniques. The authors handle 
feature selection through a minimum redundancy-maximum relevance (MRMR) 
technique based on maximum statistical dependency, choosing 40 flow and packet-based 
features. The three classification techniques are compared using both the complete traffic 
flow and just the first seven packets resulting in the highest average accuracy of 84.9% 
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occurring with the SVM fuzzy one-against-all using only the first seven packets. For all 
techniques, using only the first seven packets shows a higher average accuracy; the 
authors explain this may be because the first few packets contain the setup parameters 
and those parameters distinguish the different applications. 
The Bag-of-Words (BoW) ML classification model proposed by Zhang et al. [35] 
is designed to use application categories as a representation of the bags and centroids to 
represent the words. The authors create BoW vectors consisting of the size of the first 
five packets, source port, destination port, and transport-layer protocol; then cluster them 
to create the centroids. Vectors representing traffic categories are constructed and the 
nearest neighbor algorithm, along with the cosine similarity, calculated between the 
training representation vectors and the incoming flow representation vectors, classifies 
the incoming traffic. A novel consideration of this research is the effect of out-of-order 
packet arrival. BoW technique results are compared to those of C4.5 algorithm using both 
in-order and out-of-order packet data. The BoW methodology scores remain stable at 
88.4% while C4.5 drops from 87.15% to 78.33% when the out-of-order data is used. The 
authors explain this is because the BoW technique does not preserve any order 
information preventing it from having any effect on the classification accuracy.  
2.3.3. Other Classification Methods 
Some classification methods fail to fall neatly into one of the above categories. 
The methods still provide valuable insight into the focus of this thesis and, thus, should 
be included so they are gathered together here. Crotti et al. [36] present a classification 
algorithm built around normalized anomaly thresholds and ‘protocol fingerprints’ 
consisting of three features (packet size, inter-arrival time, and arrival order) from 
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captured traffic packets. Unlike the majority of the other classification techniques, 
authors designed this technique to be site-dependent, or not transportable, meaning each 
site needs its own fingerprints. A series of Probability Density Functions (PDFs) describe 
the behavior of the packets for certain protocols. Classification is done by statistically 
matching the behavior of the traffic flow with one of the PDFs, creating an anomaly score 
based on how far the flow is from the chosen PDF. Anomaly thresholds indicate the 
highest score a flow can have to be considered a member of a certain protocol; the 
smaller the threshold, the more accurate the classifier. The authors limit their testing to 
just three protocols (HTTP, POP3, and SMTP), looking at only the first four packets from 
each flow, achieving an average classification accuracy to around 91%.  
Li and Kianmehr [37] apply a classification methodology based on associative 
classifiers. Associative classifiers combine associative rule mining, or pattern/correlation 
searches, with classification with the intention of creating classification models that are 
easier for users to understand than previously studied ML algorithms. Essentially, the 
rules are first generated from the training set then pruned to derive the best set of rules. 
The classifier is built from that best set of rules. The three associative classification 
algorithms compared by the authors are Classification-Based Association (CBA), 
Classification-Based on Multiple Association Rules (CMAR), and Classification-Based 
on Predictive Association Rules (CPAR). Feature selection is handled through an 
embedded version of chi-squared that computes a statistic with respect to class and uses it 
to determine the value of the feature. The results show the CPAR algorithm performs the 
best out of the three tested with an overall average accuracy of 92.05%. 
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2.4. Network Threat Detection Classification Methods 
The earlier section presented previous work related to the broad category of 
general network traffic classification. The work in this section narrows the focus to 
research done specifically looking at network threat detection and classification. Many of 
the methods used to classify network traffic threats are the same as those used for 
classifying general network traffic so, to avoid unnecessary redundant discussion, they 
will not be discussed in depth in this paper. They are, however, listed in Table 2.1 so the 
reader may research them further if so desired. Related work presenting methodologies 
not already covered in the earlier section will, however be discussed in depth in this 
section. 
Table 2.1: Summary of Previously Covered Methodologies  
Applied to Network Threat Detection 
Author(s) Year Methodology Outcome 
Panda and Patra [38] 2007 Naïve Bayes 
Overall detection rate: 
95%; False positive rate: 
.02% - 26% 
Portnoy et al. [39] 2001 Clustering 
Detection rate: 18.56% - 
56.25%; False alarm rate: 
.3% - 11.37% 
Zanero and Savaresi [40] 2004 
Clustering, Payload 
Inspection 
SOM performed better 
than PDDP and K-means 
Pan et al. [41] 2003 
C4.5, Neural 
Networks 
Average detection rate: 
85.01% -93.28%; False 
positive rate: .2% - 19.7% 
Moradi and Zulkernine [42] 2004 Neural Networks Accuracy: 86% - 90% 
Xu and Wang [43] 2005 SVM, PCA 
Accuracy: 58.3% - 99.9% 
(class dependent) 
Hu W. et al. [44] 2008 AdaBoost 
Detection rate: 91.21%; 
False alarm rate: 3.14% 
Linda et al. [45] 2009 Neural Networks 
Detection rate: 66.06% - 
100%; False alarm rate: 
0% - .378% 
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 The Learning Rules for Anomaly Detection (LERAD) algorithm developed by 
Mahoney and Chan is based on association rule mining [46]. The research takes 
advantage of the network traffic characteristic of being time series data with long range 
dependencies. The purpose of the algorithm is to find conditional rules that spot rare 
events in a time series of tuples, or sequences, of attributes. The long range dependency 
can be seen as the number of matching attribute values between two tuples lessens 
inversely to the time interval between the tuples. The two sets of attributes used to test 
LERAD were IP packets and TCP streams and the dataset was restricted to only the first 
few inbound packets for each flow. Experimentation with the combined sets of attributes 
resulted in an average classification accuracy of 50%.   
Genetic algorithm based feature selection is used in combination with a decision 
tree classifier in Stein et al. [47]. The iterative process begins with the random generation 
of a population where each individual has genes representing the feature set. Each gene 
receives a value of one or zero depending on whether or not the feature is used in 
building the decision tree. A decision tree using C4.5 is built for each individual and 
tested with validation datasets. Fitness of each individual is assessed based on the 
classification error rate. The genetic algorithm then begins generating the next generation 
of the population based on those fitness values. The process is repeated with each newly 
generated population until it reaches a set number of generations. The average 
classification accuracy ranged from 80% - 99% depending on which category of attack 
was being considered.  
Linda et al. [48] present a fuzzy logic based anomaly detection system. The 
learning algorithm creates a fuzzy rule base that characterizes previously seen behavior 
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patterns for standard communication. The rule base is constructed using a real-time 
version of the nearest neighbor clustering algorithm with the incoming packets; clusters 
are then converted into the individual fuzzy rules. Real-time processing is made cost 
effective because the algorithm learns directly from the streaming data and makes storing 
the packet data unnecessary. The features used were developed in [45] and consisted of 
window-based statistics generated as a window of specified length was shifted over the 
stream of packets. Feature vectors are calculated from the packets inside the window as 
the new packets enter and the last packets exit. The fuzzy rule base is applied to the new 
input data which is then labeled as anomalous or normal. Experimentation resulted in 71 
fuzzy rules created with an average classification of 99.36% and no false positives.  
 Faloutsos proposes a method of using traffic dispersion graphs for threat detection 
[49]. The traffic dispersion graphs visualize the communication paths between the hosts 
and can model interactions such as the type and number of packets. The term “link 
homophily” is used to represent the tendency of network traffic flows with common IP 
hosts to share the same application. Link homophily in the network data reveals statistical 
dependencies between flows with common IP hosts that can be used for traffic 
classification without requiring information on the packet content or properties. The 
research introduces a new algorithm called the Neighboring Link Classifier with 
Relaxation Labeling which requires no training phase or feature generation. The 
algorithm was used in combination with the traffic dispersion graphs and reportedly 
worked successfully with botnet detection (a collection of computers used for network 
attack), however no numerical results were provided.   
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2.5. Feature Selection Using Neural Networks 
In [22] the authors demonstrate how reducing the dimensionality of the features, 
using FCBF, can improve the technique’s classification accuracy. This is shown again in 
[31], by way of multilayer neural networks. Feature reduction is addressed by inspection 
of the weights associated with each of the input nodes, eliminating those with the 
relatively smaller values. From this, the authors reduce the number of features down to 
128 for all data sets and 20 “important” features for most data sets. Other examples 
include [27], using CON and CFS methods, [37] where an embedded Chi-squared is used 
to determine the value of each feature, and [34] where features are chosen using an 
MRMR technique based on maximum statistical dependency. While many methods exist 
for performing feature selection, we will focus on different techniques using neural 
networks as this leads in to the method chosen for this thesis.  
 Setiono and Liu look at feature selection using a feedforward neural network with 
backpropagation [50]. Their methodology begins with all the features and prunes the 
irrelevant features one at a time. For each feature, the neural network’s classification 
accuracy is calculated with that feature’s weights set to zero. The feature that results in 
the smallest decrease in classification accuracy is removed. This process is repeated until 
the accuracy rate drops below and decided level. The cross-entropy function, in 
combination with a penalty function based on the magnitude of each connection’s 
weights, is used as the measurement to minimize during network training. The algorithm 
was tested with several datasets, both generated and real-world, resulting in a statistically 
significant improvement in classification accuracy with the selected features versus the 
accuracy with all of the features.  
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Belue and Bauer [51] proposed a methodology incorporating a known irrelevant 
feature (noise) into the set of features. Any feature with a saliency measure falling within 
a confidence interval around the saliency measure of the noise feature would be removed. 
Steppe and Bauer [52] built upon this methodology by requiring a paired-t test to account 
for naturally paired feature saliency observations, and a Bonferroni-type test to 
demonstrate statistical confidence. Two saliency measures are assessed in this research: 
derivative-based and weight-based. The iterative process begins with the addition of the 
noise feature to the feature set followed by generation and training of a set number of 
neural networks. The saliency measure is calculated for all features and compared to the 
saliency measure of the noise feature to see if they are statistically different. Features 
found to be statistically different are kept and the rest are eliminated. The neural network 
is then retrained using only the retained features.    Experimentation with two separate 
datasets demonstrated an improvement in network performance for both with the reduced 
feature set.  
Two terms are added to the cross-entropy cost function in order to constrain the 
derivatives of neural network output and hidden node transfer functions in research done 
by Verikas and Bacauskiene [53]. The network is then trained by minimizing the 
modified cost function and feature selection is determined by the response of the 
classification error after features are removed. Once the neural network is generated and 
trained, the classification accuracy is calculated by setting each feature, one at a time, to 
zero. The feature removal resulting in the lowest drop in accuracy is eliminated. This 
continues until only one feature is left. The entire process repeats for each neural network 
generated and the expected feature rankings and accuracy are calculated by taking the 
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average results from all of the networks generated. The features deemed salient, based on 
the set level of accuracy required, are kept and the neural network retrained. Four datasets 
were used comparing the method proposed in [53] to five other feature selection methods. 
This experimentation resulted in the proposed method achieving at least slightly higher 
classification accuracy on all tested data than any of the other tested methods.  
The method that compared closest to the one proposed in [53] comes from Bauer 
et al. [54], and is part of the methodology used in this thesis. The focus of [54] is using 
the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) in determining salient feature selection. This research is 
an extension of the research done in [51] and [52], and proposes the SNR saliency 
measure which compares the weight-based saliency measure of a feature to the weight-
based saliency measure of an injected noise feature. The SNR saliency measures for 
irrelevant features should be less than or close to zero while the measures for salient 
features should be significantly larger than zero. The higher the SNR saliency measure, 
the higher the saliency of the feature.  The SNR method was applied using three different 
datasets and compared against the performance of the algorithm developed in [50] and a 
method using Principal Component Analysis (PCA).  The SNR method performed 
comparably against the other two methods while only requiring one feature versus an 
average of 2.7 features for [50] and nine features for the PCA method.  
2.6. Summary 
This chapter presented highlights of work related to the work done in this thesis. 
The chapter opened with background information to give the reader some familiarity with 
computer networking terms and concepts. Next, the broad category of general network 
traffic classification was explored, looking at port and signature-based analysis as well as 
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different aspects of unsupervised and supervised machine learning algorithms including 
clustering and neural networks. The focus then narrowed to threat detection classification 
examining methods not discussed in the general traffic classification section. Narrowing 
further, the chapter concluded by focusing on previous work done on salient feature 
selection using neural networks and the SNR saliency measure.  
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III. Methodology 
3.1. Chapter Overview 
 This chapter describes the methodology used in this thesis. First is a description of 
the dataset, including the quantity and type of data, and the data collection process. Next 
is a breakdown of the overall methodology. The discussion continues with an explanation 
of the data preprocessing, a major endeavor, using a feature generator with some 
challenging requirements and specialized network security software to create ground 
truth data. The chapter then provides a brief summary of the science behind neural 
networks and salient feature selection, followed by a description of the software-based 
tools necessary for the data analysis. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
performance metrics used to evaluate the performance of the neural network classifier. 
 The focus of this research is the processing and analysis of network traffic capture 
data to determine the salient features when threat detection is of primary interest. Massive 
amounts of traffic data can pass through a network quickly and the sheer magnitude of 
the data makes analysis both difficult and untimely. If those particular features of the 
traffic data that provide valuable threat-assessing information could be determined, they 
could be focused on, reducing the necessary processing and analysis time, while enabling 
and enhancing network security. 
3.2. Dataset Description 
 Data for this research comes from the Cyber Defense Exercise (CDX) sponsored 
by the US National Security Agency (NSA). A description of the data and the 
situation/environment it was collected in can be found in Mullins et al. [55]. CDX is an 
annual competition held between the US Military Academy at West Point, US Air Force 
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Academy, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), US Naval Academy, US Coast Guard 
Academy, US Merchant Marine Academy, and Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT). 
The exercise provides military students the opportunity to apply defensive information 
assurance best practices in a real-world-modeled environment. During the exercise, the 
NSA, along with highly trained operators from the services’ network operations centers, 
acts as a “Red Team” of hackers, launching cyber attacks on the networks designed and 
defended by the students.  
3.2.1. Data Collection 
 As an exercise based on real-world situations, the CDX data was deemed an 
acceptable representation of the type of traffic a military network might face and thus, a 
good choice to use for this research. The network traffic data used was collected during 
the CDX from 2003 – 2007, and 2009. Having several years worth of data frees the 
analysis from being restricted to the year the data was collected (as techniques and 
exploits are constantly evolving and adapting).  
3.2.2. Collection Equipment 
 AFIT’s part of the CDX took place in the Laboratory for Information System 
Security/Assurance Research and Development (LISSARD), a subsection of the school’s 
Graduate Education Cyberspace Operations (GECO) laboratory. Equipment used for the 
CDX varied from year to year but consisted primarily of Dell and Cisco brand 
information technology (IT) products [55]. Traffic was collected off the firewall, a Dell 
server with two network ports, and captured on the external port to get all traffic coming 
into and going out of the network. The TCPDump software, running on an OpenBSD 
Linux distribution, handled the actual traffic collection.  
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3.2.3. Dataset Type and Size 
 The network traffic collected during the CDX was captured in the libpcap file 
format (commonly denoted as pcap) which is the standard format for network capture 
tools such as TCPDump [56], used mainly with Linux-based operating systems, and 
Wireshark [57], used frequently in Microsoft Windows operating systems. The pcap files 
consist of the packets transmitted between the hosts and clients for that specific collection 
time period. Figure 3.1 is a screenshot of an example packet captured in Wireshark. 
Information in the packet includes (from top to bottom) Frame, Ethernet, IP, and TCP 
parameters. The parameters listed will depend on the type of protocol the packet is sent as 
(e.g., TCP, UDP or ICMP). We can see the packet from Figure 3.1 was sent using TCP 
because it includes the TCP parameters. The very bottom of the screenshot shows the 
contents of the packet’s payload. 
Table 3.1 shows the total number of packets captured for each year of the 
provided dataset. The total number of packets in the full dataset is 12,145,569. Rather 
than focus at the packet level, the data was separated into flows designated by the four-
tuple of source and destination IP addresses and port numbers. This occurred during the 
data preprocessing stage. Typically, flows are created by the five-tuple which includes 
the previously mentioned four-tuple and the internet protocol type. Most of the packets’ 
internet protocols in the CDX dataset were TCP; however, in order to eliminate any 
protocol-based restrictions on the results, no specific efforts were made to remove other 
protocol types and the four-tuple was used instead. Traffic was considered in all 
directions: client-to-server, server-to-client, and back and forth between client and server.  
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Figure 3.1: Screenshot of an Example Network Packet 
The traffic captured also had no requirement to get a complete traffic flow, 
meaning the flow captured does not have to include the SYN and final (FIN) packets. 
Removing this limitation allows for interpretation even if the traffic capture occurred 
mid-flow or does not continue until transmission is complete. Merging the packets into 
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flows reduced the total number of observations to 2,048,918 (a flow can consist of one or 
more packets). The yearly flow breakdown is also included in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Breakdown of Dataset Packets and Flows 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 Total 
Packets 1555220 2855596 1156398 1060816 3878980 1638559 12145569 
Flows 268884 610601 38821 194001 627327 309284 2048918 
3.3. Overall Methodology 
The overall methodology for this research is broken down into two parts: data 
preprocessing and neural network analysis. Each part of the methodology is explained in 
more detail in the sections that follow. A flow chart is shown in Figure 3.2 to provide a 
visual representation of the overall methodology and how its parts fit together. 
3.4. Data Preprocessing 
A large portion of the work for this research dealt with preprocessing the data for 
analysis. Converting the provided dataset, containing packet information like in Figure 
3.1, into data readable by neural networks was both challenging and time consuming. The 
preprocessing began with feature extraction to create the flows or observations. The 
threat labels then were created and matched up with their corresponding observations. 
From there, the data went through a cleanup process involving the removal of 
observations containing incomplete data and the removal of information-less features. 
Finally, the data was randomly separated into balanced sets, containing equal numbers of 
observations per class. Other, more current, software solutions may be available to 
generate the attributes without this level of preprocessing, but were unavailable at time of 
writing. 
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Figure 3.2: Overall Methodology Flow Chart 
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3.4.1. Feature Generation  
Feature generation from the data was made possible by the fullstats.v1.0 
(Fullstats) Perl script created by Moore [22]. It is available for download from the 
University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory Downloads: BRASIL – Characterizing 
Network-based Applications page [58]. A description of the list of features generated 
from the packet capture data is in Appendix B: Original Feature List.   
3.4.1.1. Software Requirements 
Fullstats consists of three scripts that call on functionality from previously 
installed software packages. The three scripts include a flow creator, an attribute 
generator, and a script to convert the attribute output into different file formats. Because 
Fullstats was created several years ago, it requires functionality no longer supported in 
current versions of the necessary installed software packages. Information on the specific 
versions of the software packages required to run the script was provided by Ji [59]. The 
Fullstats script and its required software packages ran on the Ubuntu (Linux-based) OS 
version 5.10, referred to as “Breezy Badger”, set up as a virtual machine using Oracle 
Virtual Box. The software package versions used in this research include, GCC 4.0.1-3, 
Perl 5.8.7-5, TCPDump 3.9.1-1, TCPTrace 6.6.1, TCPDemux 20050725, and TCPSlice 
1.2a3. Most of the software listed here had to be retrieved from their individual archives 
or SourceForge.net as the update repositories have long been closed. Figure 3.3 shows a 
screenshot of the Fullstats attribute generator running in the virtual machine. Displayed 
there, from left to right, is the file number of the current file being processed, processing 
bit rate, processing frame rate, current file storage location, and estimated time of overall 
processing completion.  
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Figure 3.3: Fullstats Attribute Generator 
3.4.1.2. Equipment 
Due to the size of the provided dataset, and the time required to run all of it 
through Fullstats, processing required multiple computers. Five dedicated Dell PCs in 
AFIT’s GECO Laboratory were used, all running Microsoft Windows 7 Enterprise 
edition with Service Pack 1. Each PC had Intel Xeon 3GHz multi-core processors ranging 
from 6 to 8 cores and 20 to 32 GB of RAM. It took the five computers about 600 hours 
total to process all of the data through Fullstats. Figure 3.4 is an image of the GECO 
Laboratory where the data was processed.  
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Figure 3.4: AFIT GECO Laboratory 
3.4.1.3. Processing Issues 
A few issues came up during the Fullstats feature extraction that needed to be 
addressed to allow the script to work successfully. First off, the script for converting the 
attribute output to a particular file format had to be modified to include an “unknown” 
traffic direction, possibly because the original code was designed to focus on just the 
TCP protocol. This research makes no distinction between the TCP and UDP protocols, 
considering flows using both formats. Secondly, the large size of the capture files 
frequently caused the script to abruptly halt, so TCPDump was used to split the large 
capture files into capture files small enough for Fullstats to process. Finally, about 90% 
of the data was rendered useless because Fullstats was unable to completely process 
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many of the manually created and/or truncated packets found in the network traffic 
generated during the exercise. The sheer magnitude of the data, however, made this less 
of a concern, as there were still over 204,000 complete observations, across all years 
captured, available for analysis.  
3.4.2. Threat Label Creation 
 One of the most difficult issues when attempting to analyze network traffic is 
acquiring the ground truth data. Truth data was not provided for the CDX, during or after 
the exercise; team points were assessed based on how well the targeted systems were kept 
operational, not on the specific attacks or defensive techniques [55]. Because of the lack 
of truth data, another method of labeling the observation classes was developed using a 
network security-based Linux OS and an intrusion detection engine. 
3.4.2.1. Equipment 
 Processing from this point forward took place on two computers: a custom-built 
PC with an AMD Phenom II 3.2GHz 4-core processor with 8GB RAM and a Hewlett-
Packard Envy model laptop with an Intel Core i7 4-core processor with 8GB of RAM. 
Both computers were running Windows 7 Home Premium edition with Service Pack 1.  
3.4.2.2. Security Onion  
 Security Onion is a network security-based OS developed by Doug Burks [60]. 
The OS is based on the Ubuntu version of Linux and includes a plethora of network 
security monitoring, intrusion detection, and log management software. The version of 
Security Onion chosen was 12.04.3-20130904 64-bit, running in an Oracle Virtual Box 
virtual machine. The software tools used included TCPReplay [61], to play back the 
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capture files through the intrusion detection system sensor, and Sguil [62], a graphical 
user interface (GUI) console designed for use with the Snort intrusion detection engine. 
3.4.2.3. Snort Intrusion Detection System 
        Snort is signature-based intrusion detection system created by Sourcefire, now a 
branch of Cisco [63]. Intrusion detection is handled through the use of customizable rule 
sets which decide how the traffic should be handled based on what matches up with 
packet header or content information. The Security Onion OS came with Snort version 
2.9.5.3. The rule set used for this research was created and released by developers at 
Snort.org and was current as of November 7, 2013. Because the most recent capture data 
came from the exercise in 2009, it is assumed the Snort rule set included any threat it 
would encounter with this data set. 
3.4.2.4. Sguil 
 The Sguil console provides a human-interpretable representation of the threats 
discovered by the Snort intrusion detection system. The threat levels, assessed by the rule 
sets in the Snort engine, are differentiated by different colors. The Security Onion OS 
included Sguil version 0.8.0. The virtual machine’s network adapter was set to internal 
network only to keep any outside traffic from interfering. A MySQL-based query 
capability allows the user to search for and export labeled threat data. In the sequential 
label creation process, the capture files were run through the intrusion detection system 
using TCPReplay (version 3.4.3) with the Sguil interface opened to display the threat 
assessment output. A query using the TCPReplay start time provided a listing of the 
capture files’ threat-labeled flows which was then exported into a comma separated value 
(CSV) file format. The exported file also included the flows’ source and destination IP 
 
41 
addresses and port numbers which was used later on to merge with the observations 
created by Fullstats. 
Figure 3.5 shows a screenshot of the Sguil GUI. In the screenshot, we can see the 
assessed threat levels on the left side of the side in yellow, orange, and red. 
Corresponding parameter information makes up the rest of the table. On the bottom right 
we can see the parameters and payload of the highlighted listing.  
 
Figure 3.5: Sguil GUI Screenshot 
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3.4.3. Observation Threat Labeling 
 The primary output of Fullstats is the ARFF file format, intended for use with the 
WEKA Java-based data mining software developed at the University of Waikato in New 
Zealand [64]. This was an issue because the label files intended to merge with the 
observation data were in the CSV file format. While the WEKA software has many 
analysis tools included in it, analysis for this research was to be done using the neural net 
tool in MATLAB, which cannot read in ARFF files without additional added 
functionality. Conversion from ARFF to CSV is possible; however, Fullstats is also 
capable of outputting CSV file format versions of the observation data, making 
conversion unnecessary. Another benefit of the CSV output files from Fullstats is the 
inclusion of the IP and port information for the flows. This information was imperative in 
matching up the labels with their corresponding observations.  
The threat levels provided by Sguil consist of levels 1-5, with 1 being the highest 
threat, and 5, the lowest. For simplification, threat labels in the label files were converted 
to a 1 if the Sguil level was 4 or 5, 2 if the Sguil level was 2 or 3, and 3 if the Sguil level 
was 1, allowing for the no-threat level to be represented by a 0 and escalating from there. 
A macro written in Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) in Microsoft Excel allowed for 
an automated method of merging the observation and threat label data, based on the 
previously mentioned four-tuple of source and destination IP addresses and port numbers. 
This macro provided a large time-savings considering the number of observations in the 
data set.  
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3.4.4. Data Cleanup 
 Three steps were involved in cleaning up the data and preparing it for analysis. 
The first step dealt with missing data. As mentioned earlier, approximately 90% of the 
packet capture data was unable to be completely processed by Fullstats; this created 
many observations with missing information. Once the observation files were merged 
with the label files, the observations with missing data needed to be removed. Another 
macro was written in Excel to automate the searching and removal process.  
Some of the observation data contained the letter Y or N in response to whether or 
not the flows met certain criteria (e.g., window scaling factor was used). To keep the data 
numerical the Ys were changed to 1s and the Ns were changed to 0s in the second step of 
data cleanup.  
 The third step involved the removal of features providing no valuable information 
to the analysis. Features specific to the requirement of having a complete flow (capturing 
the SYN and FIN packets from the flow) were removed because the experiment was 
specifically designed to include incomplete flows (allows for broader interpretations). 
Other features were determined as having zero variance. If all entries in the feature are 
the same then the feature provides no new information to aid in classification. After the 
datasets were balanced (see section 3.3.5), a couple simple lines of MATLAB code 
computed the standard deviation of the provided data set and removed the indicated 
features. Removing the information-less features prior to analysis helps the neural net 
tool function correctly. Finally, the features for server and client port numbers were 
removed because port number analysis has been shown to be a poor predictor [16].  
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3.4.5. Data Balancing 
 Of the 204,000 observations, only about 16,000, or 8% of the data, were labeled 
as a threat, making the data extremely unbalanced. To give the neural net tool the best 
chance of success, new, smaller data sets were created. The pseudo-random number 
generator in Excel was used to randomly select an equal number from each class for each 
desired data set. Using this method was deemed acceptable because the random number 
function in versions of Excel 2003 or later pass the standard tests of randomness referred 
to as Diehard [65]. Three separate datasets were developed. The first, and largest set, is 
intended to determine whether or not traffic should be considered a threat (all threat level 
data combined into one class). The second set is designed to determine how well the 
different threat levels could be distinguished. The third set is a “complete” data set, meant 
to determine whether or not a threat was present and if so, the level of that threat. The 
new data sets were coded as Threat vs. No-Threat (No-Threat, Threat), Threats Only 
(Low, Medium, High), and Complete (None, Low, Medium, High). After the new data 
sets were created, 10% of each class in each data set was withheld as validation data.  
3.4.6. Final Dataset Description 
The number of alert observations versus the number of overall observations 
broken down by year is shown in Table 3.2. The small number of observations with 
threat level 1, the lowest level, greatly reduced the overall number of observations for the 
Threats Only and Complete datasets. Table 3.3 provides the breakdown of the final data 
sets chosen for analysis, including the number withheld for validation. There are an equal 
number of observations of each class in each data set. The table also includes the number 
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of features each dataset begins with after data cleanup is complete (not including the label 
feature). 
Table 3.2: Yearly Breakdown of Full Dataset 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 Total 
Observations 30829 73507 1301 9535 51777 37422 204371 
Threat observations 3357 8628 39 214 41 4037 16316 
Percentage 10.89% 11.74% 3.00% 2.24% 0.08% 10.79% 7.98% 
Table 3.3: Final Datasets for Analysis 
 
Threat vs. No-Threat Threats Only Complete 
Observations 29369 516 688 
Withheld 3263 57 76 
Total 32632 573 764 
Starting Features 229 222 224 
Classes 2 3 4 
3.5. Neural Network Analysis Methodology 
 The main focus of this research is to determine which features, derived from 
network traffic, are the most important to determining if a threat is present on the 
network. The methodology chosen to accomplish this is the feed-forward artificial neural 
network using backpropagation using signal-to-noise ratio for feature selection. This 
section discusses both the neural network concepts and the tools this research uses to 
apply the neural network classification capabilities to analyze the final datasets. 
3.5.1. Neural Networks 
Neural networks are a method of supervised machine learning modeled by the 
learning abilities of biological cognitive systems (i.e., neurons in the brain) [66]. The 
neurons are networked together to allow communication and information processing. The 
learning takes place through feedback causing parameter adjustments intended to make 
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the output more accurate. Figure 3.6 illustrates an example of a fully connected 
multilayer perceptron (MLP) artificial neural network.  
 
Figure 3.6: Fully Connected MLP ANN Example [66] 
A weighted combination of the inputs is created and the data is transformed 
through a threshold logic or transformation function. Examples of transformation 
functions include hard limiting, hyperbolic tangents, and sigmoid functions. This research 
uses the sigmoid function as the transformation function for the neural networks to 
address because it addresses the non-linearity introduced by the hidden layers, is 
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continuous (differentiable), and has a limited range (0 to 1) but never reaches a maximum 
or minimum [67]. The next few sections present definitions of terms used with neural 
networks, as well as the specific algorithm and saliency measure used in this research.  
3.5.1.1. Definitions 
 The following are definitions of terminology used when describing the neural net 
methodology. The definitions come from the class notes used in OPER685 Multivariate 
Analysis I, Spring 2013 [66].  
 Activation Function: defines the output of a node given an input or set of inputs 
 Artificial Neural Network (ANN): an information processing system (algorithm) 
that operates on inputs to extract information and produces outputs corresponding 
to the extracted information 
 Architecture: the topological arrangement of neurons, layers, and connections, 
which defines the set of modeling equations available to the ANN 
 Backpropagation: a learning algorithm for updating weights in a feed-forward 
MLP ANN that minimizes the (e.g., mean squared) mapping error 
 Epoch: a complete presentation of the dataset being used to train the MLP, or 
equivalently called a training cycle 
 Feature: in neural networks, features refer to the input vectors of information 
which are presumed to have some relation that may be helpful in distinguishing 
the various output classes; vector of features is often called an observation 
 Feed-forward: multilayer ANNs whose connections exclusively feed inputs from 
lower to higher levels; in contrast to a feedback or recurrent ANN, feed-forward 
ANNs operate only until all the inputs propagate to the output layer 
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 Hidden Units: processing elements in MLP ANN that are not included in the input 
or output layers; the part of the neural network located between the input and 
output layers 
 Learning Algorithm: equations used to modify the weights of processing elements 
in response to input and output values 
 Neuron: fundamental building block of an ANN; normally, each neuron takes a 
weighted sum of its input to determine its net input which is then processed 
through a transfer function to produce a single-valued output that is broadcast to 
‘downstream’ neurons 
 Perceptron: a type of ANN algorithm used in pattern classification problems that 
is trained using “supervision”; can be single or multilayer;  connection weights 
and thresholds can be fixed or adapted using a number of different algorithms  
 Supervised Training: a method of training adaptive ANNs that requires a labeled 
training dataset and an external teacher; using the desired response, the teacher 
provides responses for correct of incorrect classification by the network 
 Weight: processing elements (or neurons or units) receive inputs by means of 
interconnects (also called ‘connections’ or ‘links’), each of which has an 
associated weight, signifying its strength; the weights are combined to calculate 
the activation functions 
3.5.1.2. Algorithm 
 The algorithm chosen for this research is the Instantaneous Backpropagation 
Algorithm for a Single Hidden Layer Feed-Forward Neural Network; its steps are as 
follows from [66, 68]: 
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1. Randomly partition data into training, training-test, and validation sets. 
2. Normalize the feature input data. 
3. Initialize weights to small random values. 
4. Present the network with a randomly selected vector from the training set, 
denoted .px   
5. Calculate the network output pz  associated with the 
thp  training vector. 
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6. Update the weights. 
 Upper layer weights: 
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7. If training-test set error does not indicate sufficient convergence, go to step 4. 
3.5.1.3. Saliency Measure 
 The saliency measure is used to determine feature relevance in order to find a 
parsimonious feature set. The focus of this research is to determine which features of the 
dataset are salient. Two types of salient measures for neural network feature selection are 
derivative-based and weight-based [69]. The measure chosen for this research is the 
weight-based signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) saliency measure. This was discussed in Bauer 
et al. [54]. A simple weight-based saliency measure is computed as, shown in [70]: 
,
1 2
1
( )
i j
J
i j
w

 , where 
 1  is the measure for feature i , J  is the number of hidden nodes, 
1
,i jw  is 
the first layer weight between input node i  and hidden node j  
 The measure is simply the sum of the squared weights between input node 
i  and all hidden nodes 1 through J   
The SNR measure directly compares the saliency of a feature to an injected noise 
feature. The measure expands upon the simple weight-based computation as: 
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 iSNR is the value of the saliency measure for feature i , J  is the number of 
hidden nodes, 
1
,i j
w  is the weight from node i  to node j , and 
1
,N jw is the 
first layer weight from the noise node N to node j  
 The injected noise is created as a Uniform (0,1) distribution 
 The scaled logarithmic transformation of the ratio converts the saliency 
measure to a decibel scale 
The idea behind the SNR saliency measure is that if a feature is relevant to the 
output, its weights will be higher, thus making the SNR higher [54]. The noise feature is 
added to the set of features, the features are standardized to zero mean with unit variance, 
the weights are randomly initialized and assigned, the neural network is generated, and 
the SNR for each feature is calculated. The feature with the lowest of the calculated SNR 
values is dropped, the neural network generation begins again, and the process is repeated 
until only one feature and the noise feature remain 
3.5.2. MATLAB Neural Network Tool 
 Due to the complexity of the neural network and saliency measure calculations, in 
combination with size of the dataset, a software tool is required for data analysis. The 
primary tool used to analyze the final datasets is the Mathworks MATLAB Neural 
Network toolbox. From the website, “Neural Network Toolbox™ provides functions and 
apps for modeling complex nonlinear systems that are not easily modeled with a closed-
form equation. Neural Network Toolbox supports supervised learning with feedforward, 
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radial basis, and dynamic networks. With the toolbox you can design, train, visualize, and 
simulate neural networks. You can use Neural Network Toolbox for applications such as 
data fitting, pattern recognition, clustering, time-series prediction, and dynamic system 
modeling and control.” [71].  
3.5.2.1. Tool Specifics 
For standard pattern recognition without encompassing feature 
reduction/selection, one tool available, from the Neural Network Toolbox, is the pattern 
recognition tool or “nprtool”. Observation data is loaded into nprtool as inputs and 
observation labels (truth data) are loaded as outputs. Calling the tool from the MATLAB 
command line opens a GUI for the user to select the parameters. The GUI walks the user 
through selection of the input data, the target or output data, how the data should be 
broken into training, testing, validation sets, and the number of hidden neurons in the 
middle layers. From there, the user selects “train” to train the neural network on the data 
provided, which can be repeated until satisfactory results are achieved. Next, the network 
is evaluated and a number of deployment options are provided, finishing with the ability 
to save the generated network.  
3.5.2.2. Code Modifications 
The nprtool GUI is adequate when looking at smaller feature sets, as analysis 
occurs at a one-at-a-time rate, but very cumbersome when the feature sets are large. A 
nice feature of the GUI is that it allows a script to be generated based on the steps taken 
using the GUI. This script can then be used as the base code and modified to include the 
desired parameters and allow for automation. When the modified code for this research is 
used the nprtool GUI does not show; instead, the neural network training GUI appears, 
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allowing the user to view the network generation process if so desired. The rest of the 
processing takes place in the background. Figure 3.7 provides a screenshot of the neural 
network training GUI. For this research, the code was modified to include automation of 
the neural network processing through user-defined network structure, noise feature 
creation, “best” network selection, tracking of the features dropped, and a tailored data 
storage system to make sure all data is captured throughout the processing. The modified 
code can be found in Appendix C: MATLAB Code for Neural Network Processing. 
 
Figure 3.7: MATLAB Neural Network Training GUI 
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3.5.2.2.1. Hidden Nodes  
 Neural networks usually consist of three layers, input, middle, and output. The 
structures of the input and output layers are decided by the number of features in the 
dataset (input) and the number of classes of the data (output). The structure of the middle, 
or hidden, layer can play a large part in how well the neural network performs. Weights 
are applied to the data as it passes from the input layer to the hidden layer and again, as 
the data passes from the hidden layer to the output layer. The number of neurons in the 
middle layer, called hidden nodes, determines the complexity of the network. More nodes 
may generate a better performing network, but it also increase network complexity and 
processing time. The code was modified so the user can choose the number of hidden 
nodes in the network offering the ability to compare the network performance versus 
processing time trade-off. The number of hidden nodes chosen is explored in Chapter IV.  
3.5.2.2.2. Noise Creation 
 The noise feature is generated from a uniform (0, 1) distribution. The MATLAB 
“rand” function is used to create the noise feature making it the same length of the dataset 
(i.e., same number of observations). That noise feature is then appended to the dataset as 
the first column.  
3.5.2.2.3. Net Selection 
 Another benefit of the modified code is the ability to set the number of attempts 
made to generate the neural networks. This is a valuable tool because the networks 
generated occasionally get stuck at a local minimum, causing classification accuracy to 
be lower than it should. Running multiple attempts of the neural network generation 
allows a better performing network to be chosen. There are several options available to 
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use for network performance criteria such as mean square error, sum square error, and 
cross-entropy. When neural network analysis begins, the performance value is calculated 
for the network generated with each attempt. The networks are reinitialized at the start of 
each attempt. The attempt with the best performance value (usually the minimum) is 
chosen as the best network and the saliency measurements are calculated for the features. 
The feature with the smallest SNR value is then removed from the feature set and the 
process begins again. 
3.5.2.2.4. Bookkeeping 
 A necessary aspect of the automated feature removal process is keeping track of 
what features remain after each removal in order to relate the new list of features with the 
original feature set. When the feature is removed, the indexes of the features after the 
removed feature will change. Careful bookkeeping keeps that original structure intact. 
Separate arrays are used to keep track of both the features remaining (based on the 
original structure) and those features removed.  
3.5.2.2.5. Generated Data Storage 
 Running the neural network tool generates a large amount of data, from network 
performance graphs, to confusion matrices, to arrays tracking classification accuracies 
and feature removal. The modified code creates both cell arrays capable of holding large 
amounts of multidimensional data and individual plots, tailored for specific purposes, to 
make sure no valuable information is lost.  
3.5.2.2.6. Time Keeping 
 With such large amounts of data, processing time is of concern. For example, the 
previously mentioned performance versus processing time associated with the network 
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hidden layer structure. Another example is the number of attempts made generating the 
networks. The increase in performance needs to be worth the extra time it takes to 
process the data. With that in mind, the code was modified to include a timekeeper, or 
“stopwatch”, function. A timer starts when the neural network tool begins and ends with 
the completion of the last attempt at network generation. The time information is saved 
and made available for comparison.  
3.5.3. Performance Metrics 
 Evaluating the performance of a classifier is a complicated and focus-specific 
task. There are several different areas of interest that can define performance such as cost, 
speed, and accuracy [72]. The focus areas chosen depend on what is defined as important 
in the classification outcome. The performance metrics used in this research are based on 
information found in the confusion matrix and include the overall success rate, marginal 
rates, means measures, and receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves. 
3.5.3.1. Confusion Matrix 
 A confusion matrix describes how the observation classifications are distributed 
over the actual and predicted classifications in a grid-like format. The rows represent 
predicted classes and columns represent actual classes. Table 3.4 provides an example of 
a confusion matrix for a two class classifier [66]. A confusion matrix contains four values 
used to derive other performance measures: 
 True Positive (TP): percentage of correct positive class predictions; hits 
 True Negative (TN): percentage of correct negative class predictions; correct 
rejections 
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 False Positive (FP): percentage of incorrect positive class predictions; false 
alarms; type I errors 
 False Negative (FN): percentage of incorrect negative class predictions; misses; 
type II error 
 Positive (P): number of positive labeled observations 
 Negative (N): number of negative labeled observations 
Table 3.4: Two-Class Confusion Matrix 
 
Predicted 
Target Noise 
Actual 
Target TP FN 
Noise FP TN 
3.5.3.2. Overall Success Rate 
 The most commonly seen classification performance metric is the overall success 
rate, or percent correct over all instances; also referred to as overall accuracy. Overall 
accuracy is the trace of the confusion matrix, divided by the total number of instances and 
ranges from 0 to 1, or perfect misclassification to perfect classification [72]. Accuracy by 
class is also included. Class accuracy is the percent correct out of each class.  
( )
( )
TP TN
Accuracy
P N



 
3.5.3.3. Marginal Rates 
Classification accuracy is more than just the percentage of correctly classified 
observations [72]. The marginal rates (i.e., margins of the confusion matrix) provide 
useful performance metrics as well. The marginal rates metrics used in this research are 
recall (or true positive rate (TPR)), specificity (or true negative rate), precision (or 
positive predictive value), false positive rate (FPR - type I error), and false negative rate 
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(FNR – type II error) [73]. Recall measures the ability of the model to correctly predict 
observations are in a particular class [74]. Specificity is similar to recall, but for correctly 
predicting observations are not in a particular class. Precision measures the accuracy of a 
specific class being predicted. All five measures range from 0 to 1.  
          
( ) ( )
                  
( ) ( ) ( )
TP TP TN TN
Recall Specificity
P TP FN N FP TN
TP FP FN
Precision FPR FNR
TP FP FP TN TP FN
   
 
  
  
 
3.5.3.4. Means Measures 
 Two types of means measures are looked at in this research. Means measures 
focus on the per-class performance. The first is the geometric mean or G-measure. The 
G-measure is the square root of the product of precision and recall. The measure 
normalizes the true positive to the geometric mean of the predicted and actual positives 
[73].  
*G Precision Recall  
The F-measure (or F1 score) is another way to measure a classifier’s accuracy. 
The F-measure corresponds to the harmonic mean of recall and precision. It measures the 
overlapping of the actual and predicted classes and ranges from 0 to 1, or no overlap 
(worst) to complete overlap (best).  
1
*
2*
Precision Recall
F
Precision Recall


 
3.5.3.5. ROC Curves 
ROC Curves got their start as a way of explaining radio signals during World War 
II and have become a commonly used tool in machine learning research communities in 
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recent years [75]. ROC Curves provide a graphical way to visualize the tradeoff between 
TPR and FPR based as a function of some varied parameter of the classifier [66]. For this 
research the parameter is the decision threshold value for deciding which class an 
observation belongs to. Perfect classification is represented as the point (0, 1) along the 
curve (see Figure 3.8). The optimal operating point of the curve is the threshold providing 
the best combination of TPR and FPR. 
 
Figure 3.8: Two-Class ROC Curve Example 
The area under the ROC Curve (AUC) provides a metric of how well the 
classifier can predict an observation’s class. The AUC is the probability that the classifier 
will classify a randomly chosen positive instance higher than a randomly chosen negative 
instance [75]. As with the previous metrics, AUC ranges between 0 and 1, with 0 giving 
the worst predictive capability and 1 giving the best. 
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3.6. Summary 
 The methodology described in this chapter is designed to provide an accurate 
determination of the most important features in network traffic data for classifying 
threats. The initial dataset was discussed, followed by the process it took to turn that 
dataset into something useable for analysis by neural networks. After that, neural 
networks were explained. The chapter concluded with a discussion of the software tools 
and modifications necessary for analysis and a description of the metrics used for 
evaluating the neural network classification performance.  
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IV. Experimental Analysis & Results 
4.1. Chapter Overview 
 This chapter presents the analysis and results from the experiments. The chapter 
starts with a brief investigation of the overall dataset followed by a discussion of the 
chosen settings used for the MATLAB Neural Network tool. The rest of the chapter 
consists of the results and interpretation for each of the datasets used during 
experimentation. 
 Later in this chapter much effort goes into gleaning as much information as 
possible, through neural network analysis, from the datasets discussed in Chapter III. In 
order to better understand those datasets and the results of that analysis, a brief 
investigation of the overall dataset is presented. Because each of the experimental 
datasets was created from this overall dataset, the results of the investigation will, in 
general, apply to all the datasets. The investigation looked at the class breakdown, 
correlation information of the features, and the dimensionality of the dataset.  
4.2. Overall Dataset 
 The overall analyzable dataset consists of 204,371 observations. Approximately 
8% of those observations are labeled as a threat (Low, Medium, or High). A visual 
representation of the frequency of the threats is shown in Figure 4.1. Although the large 
gap between the number of threat observations and non-threat observations is likely a 
realistic expectation for what a normal government network encounters, this overloading 
of one class of data does not work well with neural network analysis. It causes the neural 
network output to be heavily skewed in favor of the overloaded class. As previously 
discussed in Chapter III, three smaller, balanced, datasets were created to address the 
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unequal class representation. Information about the three experimental datasets can be 
found in Table 3.3 in Chapter III. 
 
Figure 4.1: Overall Dataset Threat Frequency 
Looking at data correlation is an important starting point when investigating 
datasets. Looking at the correlation can reveal dependence, or relation, among the 
features and provide some insight into what features do or do not provide additional 
information (e.g., redundancy). Correlation is used, as opposed to covariance, because 
with correlation the data is normalized and unit-less, important because the scale varies 
greatly between the features. Features that are highly correlated with the class feature but 
not with each other are likely to be the salient features. Due to the high number of 
features, a color map (see Figure 4.2) is used to visualize the correlation matrix because it 
is easier to read and interpret than a number matrix would be. As can be seen in the color 
map, most of the data is uncorrelated (green) with occasional pockets of moderate 
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(yellow or light blue) to high (red or dark blue) correlation between some features. None 
of the features seem to be highly correlated with the class (first row/column – somewhat 
difficult to see); however, there does seem to be some mild to moderate correlation with 
features numbered in the teens, 80s, 90s, and 170s.  
 
Figure 4.2: Overall Dataset Correlation Color Map 
 A dimensionality assessment is another way of investigating datasets. 
Dimensionality assessments provide insight into the number of features (not necessarily 
which features) that contain information (i.e., explain the variance) about the dataset. A 
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Kaiser’s Criterion dimensionality test. Using the data correlation, the eigenvalues are 
computed for each of the features and plotted against the number of features. The number 
of features with eigenvalues of one or higher should be kept. From the plot we see about 
40 features have eigenvalues of 1 or higher. These 40 features explain about 85% of the 
variance in the data. This indicates the dimensionality of the data is 40 features; however, 
we have yet to determine which of these features, if any, are salient.  
 
Figure 4.3: Kaiser Dimensionality Plot - Overall Dataset 
4.3. MATLAB Neural Network Tool Settings 
 To maintain consistency throughout experimentation, the same function 
parameter settings were used for each run of the MATLAB Neural Network pattern 
recognition tool. Data was divided up randomly using the ‘dividerand’ setting, selecting 
70% of the data for training, 15% for testing, and 15% for training error validation. The 
transformation function used was the ‘logsig’ or Log-Sigmoid function. This function 
was described previously in Chapter III. The Scaled Conjugate Gradient backpropagation 
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function or ‘trainscg’ was selected as the neural network training algorithm. MATLAB 
includes several different training algorithms; through initial trial and error, ‘trainscg’ 
seemed faster than other algorithms with similar classification accuracy outcomes. 
Network performance was calculated using the cross-entropy algorithm. Typically, mean 
squared error is the default performance metric, but the natural log function in the cross-
entropy algorithm factors in the accuracy prediction values and becomes a more fine-
grained method of calculating error thus providing better performing networks [76].  
Table 4.1 lists out the parameter settings used to determine when the training tool 
should end a training iteration. The automation settings described in Chapter III ran the 
training tool through 30 network-generating attempts for each number of features with 
network structures containing 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50 hidden nodes. For deciding which 
class an observation belongs to, the default threshold value of .5 was used for each 
dataset. After the optimal operating characteristics were determined, the optimal 
threshold was used for the validations datasets. 
Table 4.1: MATLAB Training Tool Settings 
Training Tool Settings Setting 
Epochs (max) 500 
Time (max) 300 (seconds) 
Network Performance Goal .005 
Validation Checks (max) 10 
4.4. Dataset Analysis 
 This section walks through the results from the analysis of the three experimental 
datasets. Each of the three subsections focuses on a particular dataset, first discussing the 
chosen hidden layer structure and the overall accuracy leading to the decision on the 
number of features to keep. Next, the results of the neural network’s performance metrics 
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and optimal operating characteristics are presented. The data used for these metrics 
consists of the combination of the training and testing sets calculated using only the 
retained feature set. This is followed by the performance metrics computed with the 
neural network using the withheld validation data. Each subsection concludes with a 
discussion of the salient features for each dataset. 
4.4.1. Threat vs. No-Threat Dataset 
 The first dataset is referred to as the Threat vs. No-Threat dataset. This dataset is 
the most general and, because of that, has the most observations of the three datasets. The 
dataset is broken down into two classes; an observation is either a threat or not a threat. 
The analysis for this dataset focuses solely on determining whether or not a threat is 
present and provides no information on the risk level of the threat discussed. It is likely a 
method such as this would be used in conjunction with another threat detection method 
capable of discerning the level of the threat. 
4.4.1.1. Hidden Layer Structure – Threat vs. No-Threat Dataset 
 The number of nodes in the hidden layer makes up the hidden layer structure. The 
importance of the hidden layer structure is discussed in Chapter III. Each dataset was run 
through the MATLAB Neural Network tool using 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50 hidden nodes to 
determine which structure provided the most benefit when factored against the time 
required to process the data. Plots of the overall accuracy against the number of features 
(commonly referred to as a “knee plot”) and the overall accuracy values were considered 
for each structure to determine an appropriate performance “drop” point. Table 4.2 
presents the results of the testing done with regard to the hidden layer structure. For the 
Threat vs. No-Threat dataset, dropping below .9355 for the last time was chosen as the 
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comparison drop point. As can be seen in Table 4.2 the selection method results in a 
different number of features remaining for each hidden layer structure. The idea is to 
optimize efficiency – minimize time and the number of features while maximizing 
accuracy. A plot of the number of nodes versus the accuracy at the drop point and the 
processing time provides an easy way to visualize the tradeoff and can be seen in Figure 
4.4. It is obvious that as the number of hidden nodes increases, the accuracy stays 
relatively the same while the processing time increases. The highlighted row in Table 4.2 
shows the chosen structure of 10 nodes with 13 features remaining.  
Table 4.2: Hidden Layer Structure – Performance Comparison -  
Threat vs. No-Threat Dataset 
# of Nodes Time (s) Time Diff (s) Accuracy at Drop Features Remaining 
10 81250 0 .9358 13 
20 100856 19606 .9357 11 
30 136415 55165 .9360 9 
40 155990 74740 .9374 6 
50 199852 118602 .9377 10 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Hidden Layer Structure Comparison – Threat vs. No-Threat Dataset 
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4.4.1.2. Overall Accuracy – Threat vs. No-Threat Dataset 
 Once the hidden layer structure has been selected, we take a closer look at the 
performance of the neural network built around the number of remaining features. The 
objective is to maintain the desired classification accuracy while minimizing the number 
of features. A knee-plot of the overall accuracy against the number of features removed is 
shown in Figure 4.5. The accuracy is very consistent at around 94% while most of the 
features are removed. At feature number 217 (the noted feature), the neural network is 
performing at a 93.58% classification accuracy rate. After feature number 217 is removed 
the accuracy starts to take a steep decline and it never comes back up. This is the “knee” 
point of the plot and determines how many features are required to keep while 
maintaining the desired classification accuracy. Based on the location of the knee, the 
decision was made to keep the last 13 features remaining and evaluate the network 
performance.  
 
Figure 4.5: Overall Classification Accuracy – Threat vs. No-Threat Dataset (10 nodes) 
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4.4.1.3. Performance Metrics – Threat vs. No-Threat Dataset 
 Several performance metrics were calculated to evaluate the neural network 
created with 13 features remaining. These metrics were calculated from the results shown 
in the confusion matrix (Table 4.3) and are displayed in Table 4.4. We can see from the 
results that the generated network performs at over 93% accuracy on the data it was 
trained and tested on.  There is a consistently high classification performance both 
between classes and within classes (i.e., overall and class-based accuracies).  
FPR equates to false alarm rate. The FPRs displayed indicate an expectation of a 
2.42% false alarm rate for observations classified as benign and a 9.79% false alarm rate 
for those classified as a threat.   This means we should expect less than 3 out of 100 
observations classified as benign to actually be a threat and approximately 10 out of 100 
observations classified as a threat to actually be benign.   
Table 4.3: Confusion Matrix -  
Threat vs. No-Threat Dataset (13 Features) 
 
Predicted 
No-Threat Threat 
Actual 
No-Threat 13125 1559 
Threat 326 14359 
Table 4.4: Performance Metrics - Threat vs. No-Threat Dataset (13 Features) 
Class Accuracy Recall Precision Specificity FPR FNR G F1 
No-Threat .9358 .9758 .8938 .9021 .0242 .0979 .9339 .9330 
Threat .9358 .9021 .9778 .9758 .0979 .0242 .9392 .9387 
Overall Accuracy .9358 
4.4.1.4. Optimal Operating Characteristics – Threat vs. No-Threat Dataset 
 The next step in analyzing the outcome of selected neural network was 
determining the optimal operating characteristics for that network. The optimal operating 
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characteristics refer to the threshold used when determining what class a particular 
observation belongs to based on the output score generated by the neural network. The 
initial decision threshold for all classes in the trained dataset was the default 0.5, 
considering each dataset equally.   
ROC Curves for each class and their associated ensemble threshold plots were 
generated to check network performance and determine the optimal thresholds and can be 
seen in Figure 4.6. The ideal location for a ROC curve is the upper left corner of the 
graph and the lines shown here are very close to that; this indicates the network is 
performing well. The graph indicates there is a threshold that provides a TPR at or above 
0.9 while still keeping an FPR below 0.1 for both target classes. The ensemble threshold 
plots appear to be robust with threshold values varying between about .15 and .99 for the 
no-threat class and between about .02 and .85 for the threat class, holding an approximate 
90% classification accuracy.  
 
Figure 4.6: ROC Curves and Ensemble Threshold Plots – Threat vs. No-Threat Dataset 
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 The optimal operating characteristics were explored further looking at the AUC 
for the ROC curves. The higher the AUC is the higher the predictive capability of the 
network should be. From Table 4.5 we can see an AUC of .9614 and .9616 for the no-
threat and threat classes, respectively. These are high values indicating the network has a 
high predictive capability. The table also provides the results for the optimal TPR, FPR, 
and the associated optimal threshold and ensemble accuracy. Notice the similarities 
between the optimal FPRs and the FPRs shown in Table 4.4. This indicates using the 
optimal threshold had little effect on the expected false alarm rates of the classes.. 
Table 4.5: Optimal Operating Characteristics -  
Threat vs. No-Threat Dataset (13 Features) 
Class AUC Optimal  
TPR 
Optimal 
FPR 
Optimal 
Threshold 
Max Ensemble 
Accuracy 
No-Threat .9614 .8932 .0211 .5449 .9361 
Threat .9616 .9742 .1034 .6099 .9354 
4.4.1.5. Validation Results – Threat vs. No-Threat Validation Dataset 
Because the generated neural network learns and trains on the input data 
specifically, it is important to test the network with a separate set of validation data.  The 
optimal thresholds determined in the previous section were used for discriminating 
between the two classes. Because there are two classes of data, each with its own optimal 
threshold, the results of testing the validation data consists of two parts, one part focusing 
on the no-threat class data and the other part focusing on the threat class data.  
Table 4.6 provides the confusion matrix results using the .5449 threshold value 
with a focus on the no-threat class data. The confusion matrix results were then used to 
calculate the performance metrics for the dataset; those results are shown in Table 4.7. 
The overall accuracy is above 84% which could be still considered fairly high. The 
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precision of the threat data at over 96% indicates the neural network predicts the threat 
data class well, although the FPR indicates that may be due to over-prediction of that 
class. The effect of the optimal threshold is evident in the associated much lower no-
threat data precision result. 
We can also see the FPR changes with the validation dataset to 4.29% and 
22.15% for the no-threat and threat data classes, respectively. This means about 4 out of 
100 observations will be classified as benign when they are actually threats and about 22 
out of 100 observations will be classified as a threat when they are actually benign. The 
false alarm jump for the threat class data from 9.79% with the training data to 22.15% 
with the validation data is likely due to the neural network overfitting in the 
training/testing set. In the cyber realm a false alarm rate that high is likely to overwhelm 
network operators and cause the alert system to be disregarded.  
Table 4.6: Confusion Matrix - Threat vs. No-Threat  
Validation Dataset - No-Threat Focus (13 Features) 
 
Predicted 
No-Threat Threat 
Actual 
No-Threat 1183 449 
Threat 53 1578 
Table 4.7: Performance Metrics - Threats vs. No-Threat 
Validation Dataset – No-Threat Focus (13 Features) 
Class Accuracy Recall Precision Specificity FPR FNR G F1 
No-Threat .8462 .9571 .7249 .7785 .0429 .2215 .8329 .8250 
Threat .8462 .7785 .9675 .9571 .2215 .0429 .8679 .8628 
Overall Accuracy .8462 
 Table 4.8 shows the confusion matrix after using the .6099 threshold, focusing on 
the data classified as a threat. The network performance metrics were computed from the 
confusion matrix results and are presented in Table 4.9. The overall accuracy is again 
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over 84%. Changing the threshold to focus on the threat class data caused little change in 
the performance of the network, including the false alarm results.  
Table 4.8: Confusion Matrix - Threat vs. No-Threat  
Validation Dataset - Threat Focus (13 Features) 
 
Predicted 
No-Threat Threat 
Actual 
No-Threat 1196 436 
Threat 60 1571 
Table 4.9: Performance Metrics - Threats vs. No-Threat 
Validation Dataset – Threat Focus (13 Features) 
Class Accuracy Recall Precision Specificity FPR FNR G F1 
No-Threat .8480 .9522 .7328 .7828 .0478 .2172 .8354 .8283 
Threat .8480 .7828 .9632 .9522 .2172 .0478 .8683 .8637 
Overall Accuracy .8480 
4.4.1.6. Salient Feature Description – Threat vs. No-Threat Dataset 
This section provides a description of the 13 salient features chosen for the Threat 
vs. No-Threat dataset. Table 4.10 contains the feature numbers from the original feature 
set and their associated descriptions. The features are listed by their index number in the 
original feature set, not according to their weight. The salient features all have to do with 
the size or number of the packets (also referred to as segments) or the bytes within a 
packet. Segment size (minimums and maximums) or number of segments is part of 5 of 
the 13 features. The rest of the features consist of the number of bytes in some portion of 
the packet, including the control information, which is used to tell the network how and 
where to deliver the packet and is typically found in the packet headers or trailers.     
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Table 4.10: Salient Feature Descriptions – Threat vs. No-Threat Dataset [6] 
Original Feature Number Feature description 
10 Minimum of bytes in (Ethernet) packet, using the size of 
the packet on the wire 
17 Minimum of total bytes in IP packet, using the size of 
the payload declared by the IP packet 
80 Maximum segment size requested as a TCP option in the 
SYN packet opening the connection (server to client) 
84 Minimum segment size observed during the lifetime of 
the connection (server to client) 
86 Average segment size observed during the lifetime of the 
connection calculated as the value reported in the actual 
data bytes field divided by the actual data packets 
reported (server to client) 
96 Total number of bytes sent in the initial window (i.e., the 
number of bytes seen in the initial flight of data before 
receiving the first ACK packet from the other endpoint 
acknowledging some data – not the 3-way handshake) 
(server to client) 
97 Total number of segments (packets) sent in the initial 
window (client to server) 
98 Total number of segments (packets) sent in the initial 
window (server to client) 
173 Variance of control bytes packet (client to server) 
179 Maximum of bytes in (Ethernet) packet (server to client) 
186 Maximum of total bytes in IP packet 
187 Variance of total bytes in IP packet (server to client) 
193 Maximum of control bytes in packet 
4.4.2. Threats Only (Low, Medium, High) 
The next dataset is referred to as the Threats Only dataset. This dataset consists of 
only those observations classified as one of the three threat levels, Low, Medium, and 
High. Because of the limited number of Low threat observations, this dataset is the 
smallest of the three. Investigation into this dataset is intended to determine how well the 
neural network can distinguish between the different threat levels so no benign data is 
included. This type of analysis would work well as a post-investigation to the data 
characterized as a threat from the previous Threat vs. No-Threat dataset.  
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4.4.2.1. Hidden Layer Structure – Threats Only Dataset 
Table 4.11 presents the results of the hidden layer structure performance. For the 
Threats Only dataset, dropping below .95 for the last time was chosen as the comparison 
drop point. The plot of the number of nodes versus the accuracy at the drop point and the 
processing time can be seen in Figure 4.7. As the number of hidden nodes increases, the 
accuracy falls, stays relatively steady, and then drops while the processing time increases. 
The highlighted row in Table 4.11 shows the chosen structure of 10 nodes with 6 features 
remaining. 
Table 4.11: Hidden Layer Structure – Performance Comparison - Threats Only Dataset 
# of Nodes Time (s) Time Diff (s) Accuracy at Drop Features Remaining 
10 2798 0 .9729 6 
20 3351 553 .9612 6 
30 3699 901 .9612 8 
40 3879 1081 .9632 9 
50 4183 1385 .9516 8 
 
Figure 4.7: Hidden Layer Structure Comparison - Threats Only Dataset 
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4.4.2.2. Overall Accuracy – Threats Only Dataset 
A knee-plot of the overall accuracy against the number of features removed is 
shown in Figure 4.8. The accuracy fluctuates between about 96% and 99% as most of the 
features are removed. At feature number 217 (the noted feature), the neural network is 
performing at a 97.29% classification accuracy rate. After feature number 217 is 
removed, the accuracy starts to take a steep decline and it never comes back up. Based on 
the location of the knee, the decision was made to keep the last six features remaining 
and evaluate the network performance. 
 
Figure 4.8: Overall Classification Accuracy - Threats Only Dataset (10 nodes) 
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tested on.  The high classification performance is consistent both between classes and 
within classes (i.e., overall and class-based accuracies). Precision for the Low threat class 
indicates the neural network may not predict that class as well as it does with the other 
classes. The results for the Medium and High threat classes are similar and very high, 
suggesting the neural network classifies those classes well.     
The FPRs shown indicate an expectation of a 2.58% false alarm rate for 
observations classified as Low threat, a .88% false alarm rate for those classified as 
Medium threat, and a .59% false alarm rate for those classified as High threat.   This 
means we should expect approximately 3 out of 100 observations classified as Medium 
or High threat to actually be Low threat; less than 1 out of 100 observations classified as 
Low or High threat to actually be Medium threat; and less than 1 out of 100 observations 
classified as Low or Medium threat to actually be High threat.  The false alarm rate for 
Medium and High threat indicates the network does an excellent job differentiating 
Medium and High both between each other and against the Low class.  
Table 4.12: Confusion Matrix - Threats Only Dataset (6 Features) 
 
Predicted 
Low Medium High 
Actual 
Low 163 4 5 
Medium 3 169 0 
High 1 1 170 
Table 4.13: Performance Metrics - Threats Only Dataset (6 Features) 
Class Accuracy Recall Precision Specificity FPR FNR G F1 
Low .9748 .9760 .9477 .9742 .0258 .0240 .9618 .9617 
Medium .9845 .9713 .9826 .9912 .0088 .0287 .9769 .9769 
High .9864 .9714 .9884 .9947 .0059 .0286 .9799 .9798 
Overall Accuracy .9729 
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4.4.2.4. Optimal Operating Characteristics – Threats Only Dataset 
This section discusses the optimal operating characteristics established for the 
generated neural network. ROC Curves for each class and their associated ensemble 
threshold plots were generated to check network performance and determine the optimal 
thresholds. The plots are shown in Figure 4.9. The curve lines shown in the ROC Curve 
plots are extremely close to the upper left corner indicating a high level of performance 
from the neural network. From the graph we can see there is a threshold that provides a 
TPR close to one with an FPR close to zero for all three classes. Similar to the Threat vs. 
No-Threat dataset results, the ensemble threshold plots appear to be quite robust. 
Threshold values for Low threat class data to achieve at least 90% accuracy range from 
about 0.1 to .95.  Threshold values for Medium and High threat data to get 90% accuracy 
begin at 0 and extend to 1 and about 0.9 for Medium and High threat data, respectively. 
These operating characteristic curves reiterate that the generated neural network performs 
better with Medium and High threat data than it does with the Low threat data.   
 
Figure 4.9: ROC Curves and Ensemble Threshold Plots - Threats Only Dataset  
(10 nodes) - 6 Features 
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The AUC for the generated ROC curves was also explored. In Table 4.14 we can 
see an AUC of over .99 for all three classes. These are extremely high values indicating 
the network has an excellent predictive capability. The optimal TPR, FPR, and associated 
optimal threshold and ensemble accuracy can also be seen Table 4.14. In contrast to the 
results from the Threats vs. No-Threats dataset, there is little difference between the 
optimal FPRs and the FPRs shown in Table 4.13. This is likely due to the robustness of 
the optimal threshold as varying the threshold seems to cause much of an effect on the 
accuracy outcome. The ranking of the false alarm percentage did swap between the 
Medium and High threat data but they are both still at less than 1%.   
Table 4.14: Optimal Operating Characteristics - Threats Only Dataset (6 Features) 
Class AUC Optimal 
TPR 
Optimal 
FPR 
Optimal 
Threshold 
Max Ensemble 
Accuracy 
Low .9931 .9419 .0116 .5627 .9729 
Medium .9988 .9709 .0029 .6213 .9884 
High .9959 .9826 .0087 .8146 .9884 
4.4.2.5. Validation Results – Threats Only Validation Dataset 
The optimal thresholds determined in the previous section were used for testing 
the validation data. The following results consist of three parts focusing on each of the 
Low, Medium, and High threat class data.  
Table 4.15 shows the confusion matrix results using the .5627 threshold value 
with a focus on the Low threat class data. These results were then used to calculate the 
performance metrics for the dataset which are shown in Table 4.16. The overall accuracy 
is above 87% which could be still considered fairly high but is a 10 percentage point drop 
from the training dataset overall accuracy. The precision of the Low threat data at 
approximately 79%, when compared to the 89% and 95% for the Medium and High 
 
80 
threat data, reinforces the earlier notion that the neural network does not predict the Low 
threat data class as well as the other classes. The results do show, however, when the 
focus is on identifying the Low threat, the neural network’s recall performance is much 
better for the Low class than either of the other classes.  
We can also see there is a jump in the false alarm rate for all classes with the 
validation data.  The FPR went up to 9.76% for the Low threat class data, 5.41% for the 
Medium threat class data, and 2.78% for the High threat class data.  This translates to an 
expectation of about 10 out of 100 observations classified as Medium or High threat 
when they are actually Low; about 5 out of 100 observations classified as Low or High 
when they are actually Medium; and about 3 out of 100 observations classified as Low or 
Medium threat when they are actually High. The false alarm jump is again likely due to 
the neural network overfitting on the training/testing set.  
Table 4.15: Confusion Matrix – Threats Only  
Validation Dataset – Low Threat Focus (6 Features) 
 
Predicted 
Low Medium High 
Actual 
Low 15 3 1 
Medium 0 17 2 
High 1 0 18 
Table 4.16: Performance Metrics - Threats Only 
Validation Dataset – Low Threat Focus (6 Features) 
Class Accuracy Recall Precision Specificity FPR FNR G F1 
Low .9123 .9375 .7895 .9024 .0976 .0625 .8603 .8571 
Medium .9123 .8500 .8947 .9459 .0541 .1500 .8721 .8718 
High .9298 .8571 .9474 .9722 .0278 .1429 .9011 .9000 
Overall Accuracy .8772 
 Table 4.17 shows the confusion matrix after using the .6213 threshold, focusing 
on the data classified as Medium threat. The network performance metrics were 
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computed from the confusion matrix results and are presented in Table 4.18. The results 
are identical to those found when focusing on the Low threat class. Looking at the neural 
network score output, the scores for each observation are generally high in one class’ cell 
suggesting the network was able to distinguish between the classes at a high level. The 
change in the threshold was not enough to affect the prediction outcome so the results 
turned out exactly the same. 
Table 4.17: Confusion Matrix – Threats Only  
Validation Dataset – Medium Threat Focus (6 Features) 
 
Predicted 
Low Medium High 
Actual 
Low 15 3 1 
Medium 0 17 2 
High 1 0 18 
Table 4.18: Performance Metrics - Threats Only 
Validation Dataset – Medium Threat Focus (6 Features) 
Class Accuracy Recall Precision Specificity FPR FNR G F1 
Low .9123 .9375 .7895 .9024 .0976 .0625 .8603 .8571 
Medium .9123 .8500 .8947 .9459 .0541 .1500 .8721 .8718 
High .9298 .8571 .9474 .9722 .0278 .1429 .9011 .9000 
Overall Accuracy .8772 
Table 4.19 shows the confusion matrix after using the .8146 threshold, focusing 
on the data classified as High threat. The network performance metrics were computed 
from the confusion matrix results and are presented in Table 4.20. The overall accuracy 
stayed exactly the same at 87.72%.  Focusing on the High threat class evened out recall 
and precision for the Low and Medium threat class data. This balancing out was the result 
of the prediction values for the Low and Medium threat turning out the same with 16 true 
positives and 3 false positives. The false alarm rate reflected the effect as well with the 
High threat data remaining at 2.78% and the Low and Medium threat data even at 7.69%.  
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Table 4.19: Confusion Matrix – Threats Only  
Validation Dataset – High Threat Focus (6 Features) 
 
Predicted 
Low Medium High 
Actual 
Low 16 2 1 
Medium 1 16 2 
High 1 0 18 
Table 4.20: Performance Metrics - Threats Only Validation Dataset –  
High Threat Focus (6 Features) 
Class Accuracy Recall Precision Specificity FPR FNR G F1 
Low .9123 .8889 .8421 .9231 .0769 .1111 .8652 .8649 
Medium .9123 .8889 .8421 .9231 .0769 .1111 .8652 .8649 
High .9298 .8571 .9474 .9722 .0278 .1429 .9011 .9000 
Overall Accuracy .8772 
4.4.2.6. Salient Feature Description – Threats Only Dataset 
This section provides a description of the six salient features chosen for the 
Threats Only dataset (see Table 4.21). All of the salient features pertain to segment size 
or number of bytes in a section of the packet, again, mostly the control section. The one 
exception is the minimum window advertisement seen. The window advertisement is a 
flow control mechanism sent from the receiver letting the sender know how much of data 
can be received before the sender has to wait for an acknowledgment. 
Table 4.21: Salient Feature Description - Threats Only Dataset [6] 
Original Feature Number Feature description 
81 Maximum segment size observed during the life of the 
connection (client to server) 
83 Minimum segment size observed during the life of the 
connection (client to server) 
90 Minimum window advertisement seen (if both sides 
negotiated window scaling)(server to client) 
171  Third quartile of control bytes in packet 
173 Variance of control bytes in packet 
180 Variance of bytes in Ethernet packet 
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4.4.3. Complete Set (None, Low, Medium, High) 
The final dataset is the Complete dataset. This dataset consists of four classes: 
None, Low threat, Medium threat, and High threat. The limited number of Low threat 
observations affects the size of this dataset as it did the Threats Only dataset, however, 
with the inclusion of the None data, this data is slight larger. Investigation into this 
dataset is intended to test how well the neural network can not only detect a threat, but 
also determine the level of the threat. Unlike the previous datasets, this method should be 
able to stand on its own without further processing. 
4.4.3.1. Hidden Layer Structure – Complete Dataset 
Table 4.22 presents the results of the hidden layer structure performance. For the 
Complete dataset, dropping below .8 for the last time was chosen as the comparison drop 
point. The plot of the number of nodes versus the accuracy at the drop point and the 
processing time can be seen in Figure 4.10. Unlike the previous datasets, classification 
performance jumps as the nodes increase to 30 before dropping rapidly, while incurring 
only a mild increase in processing time, thus making 30 nodes the chosen structure as 
opposed to the 10 nodes used for the previous datasets. The highlighted row in Table 4.22 
shows the chosen structure of 30 nodes with 8 features remaining. 
Table 4.22: Hidden Layer Structure - Performance Comparison - Complete Dataset 
# of Nodes Time (s) Time Diff (s) Accuracy at Drop Features Remaining 
10 3573 0 .8110 11 
20 3634 61 .8110 10 
30 4063 490 .8256 8 
40 4149 576 .8125 7 
50 4561 988 .8009 7 
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Figure 4.10: Hidden Layer Structure Comparison - Complete Dataset 
4.4.3.2. Overall Accuracy – Complete Dataset 
A knee-plot of the overall accuracy against the number of features removed is 
shown in Figure 4.11. The accuracy bounces between about 83% and 87% as most of the 
features are removed. At this point we see indicators that the neural network does not 
distinguish threat and threat levels as well as it does when they are separated, as the 
overall accuracy of the training data is, on average,  at least a full 10 percentage points 
lower than it was for each of the other datasets. At feature number 217 (the noted 
feature), the neural network is performing at an 82.56% classification accuracy rate. After 
feature number 217 is removed, the accuracy starts to decline and never comes back up. 
Based on the location of the knee, the decision was made to keep the last eight features 
remaining and evaluate the network performance. 
 
10 20 30 40 50
0.8
0.805
0.81
0.815
0.82
0.825
0.83
A
c
c
u
ra
c
y
 a
t 
D
ro
p
 P
o
in
t
Number of Neurons in Hidden Layer
Hidden Layer Structure Comparison
Complete Dataset
 
 
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
P
ro
c
e
s
s
in
g
 T
im
e
 (
s
)
Accuracy
Processing Time
 
85 
 
Figure 4.11: Overall Classification Accuracy - Complete Dataset (30 nodes) 
4.4.3.3. Performance Metrics – Complete Dataset 
Performance metrics were calculated to evaluate the neural network created with 
eight features remaining. These metrics were calculated from the results shown in the 
confusion matrix (see Table 4.23) and are displayed in Table 4.24. From the results we 
can see the generated network performs at almost 83% accuracy on the data it was trained 
and tested on.  The classification performance is inconsistent both between classes and 
within classes (i.e., overall and class-based accuracies). The None and Low threat 
classification accuracies are similar to each other but different from the Medium and 
High threat classification accuracies. The low precision values for the None and Low 
threat classes, in contrast to the high values for the Medium and High threat classes, 
indicate the neural network may not predict those classes as well as it does with the other 
classes.  Classification of the Medium threat class seems to generally be the highest 
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The FPRs shown indicate an expectation of an 11.28% false alarm rate for 
observations classified as None, 7.72% false alarm rate for those classified as Low threat, 
2.68% false alarm rate for those classified as Medium threat, and 1.04% false alarm rate 
for those classified as High threat.   This means we should expect about 11 out of 100 
observations classified as some level of threat to actually be benign; 8 out of 100 
observations classified as None, Medium, or High threat to actually be Low threat; 3 out 
of 100 observations classified as None, Low, or High threat to actually be Medium threat; 
and 1 out of 100 observations classified as None, Low, or Medium threat to actually be 
High threat.  The network appears to distinguishing the High threat well. 
Table 4.23: Confusion Matrix - Complete Dataset (8 Features) 
 
Predicted 
None Low Medium High 
Actual 
None 111 29 4 28 
Low 31 132 3 6 
Medium 3 7 158 4 
High 2 2 1 167 
Table 4.24: Performance Metrics - Complete Dataset (8 Features) 
Class Accuracy Recall Precision Specificity FPR FNR G F1 
None .8590 .7551 .6453 .8872 .1128 .2449 .6981 .6959 
Low .8866 .7765 .7674 .9228 .0772 .2235 .7719 .7719 
Medium .9680 .9518 .9186 .9732 .0268 .0482 .9351 .9349 
High .9375 .8146 .9709 .9896 .0104 .1854 .8894 .8859 
Overall Accuracy .8256 
4.4.3.4. Optimal Operating Characteristics – Complete Dataset 
ROC Curves for each class and their associated ensemble threshold plots were 
generated to check network performance and determine the optimal thresholds. The plots 
are shown in Figure 4.12. The curve lines shown in the ROC Curve plots for the Medium 
and High threat classes are close to the upper left corner indicating a high level of 
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performance from the neural network. From the graph we can see there is a threshold that 
provides a TPR greater than .9 with an FPR less than .1 for both classes. The curves for 
the None and Low threat classes suggest the neural network does not perform as well for 
classifying those two classes as the FPR needed for a TPR of .9 is close to .3, meaning 
30% of the classification would result in false alarms. Similar to the previous dataset 
results, the ensemble threshold plots appear to be fairly robust, although the achieved 
accuracy is not as high for the Complete dataset. There is an obvious gap between the 
accuracies of the None and Low threat classes and the Medium and High classes. These 
operating characteristic curves demonstrate that the generated neural network performs 
better with Medium and High threat data than it does with the None and Low threat data.   
 
Figure 4.12: ROC Curves and Ensemble Threshold Plots - Complete Dataset 
 (30 nodes) - 8 Features 
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network has an excellent predictive capability for those particular classes. The lower 
AUC values for the None and Low threat classes show the neural network has a good but 
not great predictive capability. The optimal TPR, FPR, and associated optimal threshold 
and ensemble accuracy can also be seen in the table. There is a noticeable difference 
between the optimal FPRs and the FPRs shown in Table 4.24. This difference indicates 
that, similarly to the Threat vs. No-Threat dataset, the threshold has an effect on the false 
alarm rate.  
Table 4.25: Optimal Operating Characteristics - Complete Dataset (8 Features) 
Class AUC Optimal 
TPR 
Optimal 
FPR 
Optimal 
Threshold 
Max Ensemble 
Accuracy 
None .9055 .6919 .0814 .4106 .8619 
Low .9287 .6802 .0523 .5854 .8808 
Medium .9838 .9244 .0136 .4022 .9709 
High .9828 .9593 .0465 .5672 .9549 
4.4.3.5. Validation Results – Complete Validation Dataset 
As with the previous datasets, the optimal thresholds determined in the previous 
section were used for testing the validation data. The following results consist of four 
parts focusing on each of the None, Low, Medium, and High threat class data.  
Table 4.26 shows the confusion matrix results using the .4106 threshold value 
with a focus on the None class data. These results were then used to calculate the 
performance metrics for the dataset which are shown in Table 4.27. The overall accuracy 
dropped to 65.79%, a reduction by almost 15 percentage points from the training data.  
Recall is a low 43% and 53% for the None and Low threat class data compared to 100% 
and 75% for the Medium and High threat data. Precision presents similar results. This 
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reinforces the earlier notion that the neural network does not predict the None and Low 
threat data class as well as it does for the other two classes.  
The false alarm rate increases for all classes with the validation data; the highest 
increase is with Low class data which rose over 10 percentage points. Coupled with the 
FPR of the None class (at almost 17%), the Low class FPR increase likely has to do with 
the neural network having a difficult time distinguishing between the None and Low 
threat classes.   The results translate to an expectation of about 17 out of 100 observations 
classified as some threat level when they are actually None; 18 out of 100 observations 
classified as None, Medium, or High threat when they are actually Low threat; 8 out of 
100 observations classified as None, Low, or High threat when they are actually Medium 
threat; and 2 out of 100 observations classified as None, Low, or Medium threat when 
they are actually High threat.  
Table 4.26: Confusion Matrix – Complete Validation Dataset  
– No-Threat Focus (8 Features) 
 
Predicted 
None Low Medium High 
Actual 
None 10 4 0 5 
Low 10 8 0 1 
Medium 2 3 14 0 
High 1 0 0 18 
Table 4.27: Performance Metrics - Complete Validation Dataset 
– No-Threat Focus (8 Features) 
Class Accuracy Recall Precision Specificity FPR FNR G F1 
None .7105 .4348 .5263 .8302 .1698 .5652 .4784 .4762 
Low .7632 .5333 .4211 .8197 .1803 .4667 .4739 .4706 
Medium .9342 1.000 .7368 .9194 .0806 0 .8584 .8485 
High .9079 .7500 .9474 .9808 .0192 .2500 .8429 .8372 
Overall Accuracy .6579 
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Table 4.28 shows the confusion matrix after using the .5854 threshold, focusing 
on the data classified as Low threat. Table 4.29 contains the performance metrics 
computed from the confusion matrix results. The overall accuracy dropped slightly from 
the None class focused value to 63.16%.  Focusing on the Low threat reduced the neural 
network’s performance on all four of the classes. This reduction in performance includes 
the false alarm rate with FPR staying the same or increasing for all classes.  
Table 4.28: Confusion Matrix – Complete Validation Dataset  
– Low Threat Focus (8 Features) 
 
Predicted 
None Low Medium High 
Actual 
None 10 4 0 5 
Low 11 7 0 1 
Medium 2 3 14 0 
High 2 0 0 17 
Table 4.29: Performance Metrics - Complete Validation Dataset  
– Low Threat Focus (8 Features) 
Class Accuracy Recall Precision Specificity FPR FNR G F1 
None .6842 .4000 .5263 .8235 .1765 .6000 .4588 .4545 
Low .7500 .5000 .3684 .8065 .1935 .5000 .4292 .4242 
Medium .9342 1.000 .7368 .9194 .0806 0 .8584 .8485 
High .8947 .7391 .8947 .9623 .0377 .2609 .8132 .8095 
Overall Accuracy .6316 
Table 4.30 shows the confusion matrix after using the .4022 threshold, focusing 
on the data classified as Medium threat; the associated performance metrics are presented 
in Table 4.31. The results are identical to those found when focusing on the None class; 
this is not surprising with the threshold values being so similar (.4106 vs. .4022). The 
change in the threshold is not large enough to create a change in the classification of the 
neural network’s output scores.  
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Table 4.30: Confusion Matrix – Complete Validation Dataset  
- Medium Threat Focus (8 Features) 
 
Predicted 
None Low Medium High 
Actual 
None 10 4 0 5 
Low 10 8 0 1 
Medium 2 3 14 0 
High 1 0 0 18 
Table 4.31: Performance Metrics - Complete Validation Dataset  
– Medium Threat Focus (8 Features) 
Class Accuracy Recall Precision Specificity FPR FNR G F1 
None .7105 .4348 .5263 .8302 .1698 .5652 .4784 .4762 
Low .7632 .5333 .4211 .8197 .1803 .4667 .4739 .4706 
Medium .9342 1.000 .7368 .9194 .0806 0 .8584 .8485 
High .9079 .7500 .9474 .9808 .0192 .2500 .8429 .8372 
Overall Accuracy .6579 
Table 4.32 shows the confusion matrix after using the .5672 threshold, with a 
focus on the data classified as High threat. The neural network performance metrics were 
computed from the confusion matrix results and are presented in Table 4.33. Focusing on 
the High threat reduced the neural network’s performance on all four of the classes. The 
reduction in performance includes the false alarm rate with FPR staying the same or 
increasing for all classes.  
Table 4.32: Confusion Matrix – Complete Validation Dataset  
– High Threat Focus (8 Features) 
 
Predicted 
None Low Medium High 
Actual 
None 10 4 0 5 
Low 11 7 0 1 
Medium 2 3 14 0 
High 1 0 0 18 
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Table 4.33: Performance Metrics - Complete Validation Dataset  
– High Threat Focus (8 Features) 
Class Accuracy Recall Precision Specificity FPR FNR G F1 
None .6974 .4167 .5263 .8269 .1731 .5833 .4683 .4651 
Low .7500 .5000 .3684 .8065 .1935 .5000 .4292 .4242 
Medium .9342 1.000 .7386 .9194 .0806 0 .8584 .8485 
High .9079 .7500 .9474 .9808 .0192 .2500 .8429 .8372 
Overall Accuracy .6447 
Varying the threshold for this dataset seems to have little effect; it either reduced 
or maintained the performance results. The little variance in the optimal threshold values 
indicates the neural network output scores for the Complete dataset must also have little 
variance making it more difficult to distinguish between them.   
4.4.3.6. Salient Feature Description – Complete Dataset 
This section provides a description of the eight salient features chosen for the 
Complete dataset. Table 4.34 contains the feature numbers from the original feature set 
and their associated descriptions.  
Table 4.34: Salient Features - Complete Dataset [6] 
Original Feature Number Feature description 
17 Minimum of total bytes in IP Packet, using the size of the 
payload declared by the IP Packet 
26 Median of control bytes in packet 
86 Average segment size observed during the lifetime of the 
connection calculated as the value reported in the actual 
data bytes field divided by the actual data packets reported 
(server to client) 
90 Minimum window advertisement seen (if both sides 
negotiated window scaling)(server to client) 
158 Maximum of bytes in (Ethernet) packet 
173 Variance of control bytes in packet 
178 Third quartile of bytes in (Ethernet) packet 
187 Variance of total bytes in IP packet 
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Similarly to the previously analyzed datasets, the salient features reference the 
number of bytes in certain sections of the packet (Ethernet and IP), segment size feature, 
and the minimum window advertisement seen. 
4.5. Summary 
This chapter presented the results and analysis for the experimentation done with 
the three datasets developed in Chapter III. Neural networks were generated for each 
dataset. The best network for each dataset was chosen based on a combination of a 
heuristically chosen hidden layer structure and the overall accuracy percentage drop as 
features were removed. The Threat vs. No-Threat dataset exploration resulted in a hidden 
layer structure containing 10 nodes, with 13 features retained. The Threats Only dataset’s 
chosen structure contained 10 nodes as well, with 6 features retained. The Complete 
dataset, encompassing both the benign and threat-level distinguish data, resulted in a 30 
node hidden layer and 8 features retained. 
Performance metrics were calculated for each dataset’s chosen neural network. 
The Threats Only dataset had the best overall classification accuracy with 97.29%, 
followed by the Threat vs. No-Threat dataset with 93.58%, and the Complete dataset with 
82.56%. An examination of the optimal operating characteristics using ROC curves and 
ensemble threshold plots resulted in a similar ranking between the three datasets.  
The results from the optimal operating characteristics were used with the 
validation datasets, the 10% withheld from the original dataset, to test the general 
predictive capabilities of the selected neural networks for each dataset. The edge for 
overall classification accuracy went to the Threats Only dataset with the Threat vs. No-
Threat dataset following behind. The results from analysis of the Complete dataset show 
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a distinct weakness in the generated neural network’s predictive capability for 
distinguishing across the four classes of data. The high classification performance shown 
for the Medium and High threat classes is countered by the mediocre performance shown 
for the None and Low threat classes. 
 False alarm rates for each class in each dataset were also explored. The Threat vs. 
No-Threat and Complete datasets presented the highest false alarm rates, especially for 
the validation data. This was not surprising considering the neural networks for those 
datasets performed the worst. The high false positive rates could possibly be mitigated 
through use of a secondary classification or ensemble method.  
 Finally, the salient features of each dataset were discussed. One feature, number 
173 (variance of control bytes in packet) appeared in all three datasets. Numbers 17 
(Minimum of total bytes in IP Packet, using the size of the payload declared by the IP 
Packet), 86 (Average segment size observed during the lifetime of the connection 
calculated as the value reported in the actual data bytes field divided by the actual data 
packets reported (server to client)), 90 (Minimum window advertisement seen (if both 
sides negotiated window scaling) (server to client)), and 187 (Variance of total bytes in 
IP packet (server to client)) were each seen in 2 of the datasets. The rest of the features 
shared segment size or a count of the number of bytes in sections of the packets in 
common.
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V. Conclusion 
5.1. Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides the key elements derived from this research. Next it 
discusses how this research may contribute to both the operations research and cyber 
defense fields. The chapter concludes with some thoughts on potential future research.  
5.2. Conclusions of Research 
This research determined that 21 of the original 248 features were salient to 
classifying computer network threats. Common components of these salient features 
included segment size (maximum and minimum), number of segments or bytes sent in 
the initial window, the minimum window advertisement seen,  and a count of the number 
of bytes in Ethernet, IP, or control packet sections (maximum, minimum, quartiles, total, 
and variance). Table 5.1 lists the 21 salient features. This list combines those features 
deemed salient from all three datasets.  
Considering the features by their associated category provides insight into where 
the salient information resides. Almost half of the features (10 of 21) are part of the 
Transport (typically TCP) section of the packet. This is slightly deceptive, however, if the 
correlation between the features is examined. Features 81 and 83 share a 97.8% 
correlation. This is not surprising as the features are either minimums or maximums of 
the same information (segment size from client to server). It is likely only one of each of 
those features is necessary to acquire the available information. A similar situation occurs 
with features 80 and 90 with a correlation of 75.9%.   
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Table 5.1: Salient Feature Categorization [6] 
Original Feature 
Number 
Feature description Category 
26 Median of control bytes in packet 
Transport 
80 Maximum segment size requested as a TCP option in the 
SYN packet opening the connection (server to client) 
81 Maximum segment size observed during the life of the 
connection (client to server) 
83 Minimum segment size observed during the life of the 
connection (client to server) 
84 Minimum segment size observed during the lifetime of 
the connection (server to client) 
86 Average segment size observed during the lifetime of the 
connection calculated as the value reported in the actual 
data bytes field divided by the actual data packets 
reported (server to client) 
90 Minimum window advertisement seen (if both sides 
negotiated window scaling)(server to client) 
171  Third quartile of control bytes in packet (client to 
server) 
173 Variance of control bytes in packet(client to server)  
193 Maximum of control bytes in packet (server to client) 
96 Total number of bytes sent in the initial window (i.e., the 
number of bytes seen in the initial flight of data before 
receiving the first ACK packet from the other endpoint 
acknowledging some data – not the 3-way handshake) 
(server to client) 
Initial 
Window 
97 Total number of segments (packets) sent in the initial 
window (client to server) 
98 Total number of segments (packets) sent in the initial 
window (server to client) 
10 Minimum of bytes in (Ethernet) packet, using the size of 
the packet on the wire 
Ethernet 
158 Maximum of bytes in (Ethernet) packet(client to server) 
178 Third quartile of bytes in (Ethernet) packet(server to 
client) 
179 Maximum of bytes in (Ethernet) packet (server to client) 
180 Variance of bytes in Ethernet packet (server to client) 
17 Minimum of total bytes in IP Packet, using the size of 
the payload declared by the IP Packet 
IP 
186 Maximum of total bytes in IP packet (server to client) 
187 Variance of total bytes in IP packet (server to client) 
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This correlation is also not surprising as they are both server-based functions to 
manage traffic flow (feature 80 synchronizes the initial segment size while feature 90 
manages how large each segment size thereafter is). Keeping only one of each of the 
highly correlated features reduces the number of Transport features to 8, which is still 
close to double the number of features contained in the other categories.  
 Another high correlation within a category occurs between features 179 and 180, 
in the Ethernet category, with a correlation of 94.1%. The Ethernet wrapper encompasses 
the entire packet so it is understandable that the size of the packet would be a threat 
indicator. Similarly to the highly correlated features in the Transport category, the 
correlation value between the feature 179 and 180 suggests keeping only 1 of them would 
still provide the available information. 
 A between category correlation of 83.3% occurs between feature 10 in the 
Ethernet category and feature 17 in the IP category. Ethernet wraps around the IP part of 
the packet so it is not surprising that the number of bytes is correlated between the two. 
The other category of packet information shown here is the Initial Window. The 
initial window consists of the initial data sent (after the three-way handshake establishing 
the communication link) from one end point to another before the first acknowledgment 
is received by the sender. The initial window’s inclusion as salient points out that threat 
information is likely to appear in the first round of data passing between end points. 
The outcome of this research reveals that the neural networks generated in this 
research seem to be best suited for distinguishing whether or not a threat exists or, if a 
threat exists, what risk level the threat is. When the two concepts are combined the 
network performance suffers. The salient features are contained in four general categories 
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of packet or flow information: Transport, Initial Window, Ethernet, and IP. Most of the 
features fall under the Transport category and, especially when size is the metric, end up 
affecting the Ethernet and IP values because of the packet structure. Segment size or 
number of bytes seems to have the highest effect on threat classification. Taking feature 
correlation greater than 80% into consideration, the original list of 248 features can be 
pruned down to 18 features while still retaining enough information to detect threats with 
high accuracy. 
5.3. Research Contributions 
This research makes its contributions in two ways. The first way is providing 
insight into what components of network traffic should be focused on when trying to 
detect and classifying potential threats. The magnitude of network traffic information is 
overwhelming and most of it is likely unimportant. Knowing what areas to focus on 
allows for faster, more efficient, processing and hopefully, better protection against any 
potential threats.  
The second contribution is the less obvious but still important demonstration of 
combining the field of OR with the field of cyber operations. The developmental process 
for this thesis provides testimony to the value of multidisciplinary OR personnel. 
Familiarity with computer programming and computer communication networks allowed 
for the data processing and, after applying the OR tools, comprehension and 
interpretation of the results. Without knowledge and application of concepts in both 
fields, this research could not have been done. Members of the OR field should be 
encouraged to gain expertise in other fields to see what OR tools and techniques can be 
applied and new information discovered.  
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5.4. Recommendations for Future Research 
The research in this thesis is limited to the scope time and available resources 
allowed. Other aspects of the research may be worthy considering for future research. 
One future consideration could be cost of misclassification. The costs of miscalculation 
were considered equally for this research (i.e., there was no difference in the penalty for 
failing to classify any of the classes). It might be beneficial, considering the potential 
detrimental effects of a successful Medium or High threat intrusion, to conduct an 
analysis of the salient features weighting the costs of miscalculating the Medium or High 
threat observations heavier than that of the benign or Low threat observations. 
Another consideration for future research could be looking at online, or real-time, 
versus offline classification. The research in this thesis was conducted on data that was 
previously captured. Discovering a threat offline provides little opportunity to prevent 
intrusion – it is reactive as opposed to proactive. Determining which features work best 
for a real-time analysis could enable better computer network protection, especially if 
combined with reduced resources necessary if only the first few packets of a flow are 
needed.  
A final future research consideration could be exploring the different training 
algorithms available for training and evaluating neural network performance. The 
algorithms and methods chosen for this research were chosen mainly due to time 
constraints. It is possible some of the other training algorithms may train better 
performing networks and produce improved results. 
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5.5. Summary 
This research examined computer network traffic to determine what features of 
the traffic were salient to detecting and classifying threats. The data captured from the 
CDX was converted to a dataset with 248 features which was then separated into 3 
smaller, specifically designed datasets. These datasets were reduced, through the use of 
neural networks, to sets ranging from 6 to 13 features. The combined number of features 
totaled 21, although looking at the correlation between the features revealed the possible 
presence of redundancy. The generated neural networks performed at a high level when 
either detecting threats or distinguishing between them, but performance suffered when 
combining both concepts. Four categories of packet information emerged as being salient 
to threat detection and classification: Transport, Initial Window, Ethernet, and IP. 
Tactics and techniques of network attack change and adapt over time. Because the 
dataset used in this research spanned seven years, the results show temporal stability in 
the outcome. It is quite possible, however, this could change though as new protocols 
emerge (e.g., IPv6) and new technologies offer those with malicious intent new ways of 
accessing computer networks. Like the potential attackers, the protection must adapt and 
examination of the salient features should be done periodically to discover any changes.  
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Appendix A: Acronym List 
Acronym Definition 
ACK Acknowledge 
AFIT  Air Force Institute of Technology 
ANN  Artificial Neural Network 
AUC Area under the curve 
BayesNet  Bayesian Network 
BoF Bag-of-Flows 
BoW  Bag-of-Words 
C4.5 C4.5 Decision Tree 
CBA  Classification-Based Association 
CDX  Cyber Defense Exercise 
CFS  Correlation-based algorithm 
CMAT  Classification-Based on Multiple Association Rules 
CON Consistency-based algorithm 
CPAR  Classification-Based on Predictive Association Rules 
CSV  Comma Separated Values 
DBSCAN Density-based Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise 
DoD Department of Defense 
EM Expectation Maximization 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FCBF Fast Correlation Based Filter 
FIN  Final 
FN  False Negative 
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FNR False Negative Rate 
FP  False Positive 
FPR  False Positive Rate 
FTP File Transfer Protocol 
GECO  Graduate Education Cyberspace Operations 
GUI  Graphical User Interface 
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol  
ICMP Internet Message Control Protocol 
IP Internet Protocol 
ISO International Organization for Standardization 
kNN k-Nearest Neighbor 
LERAD Learning Rules for Anomaly Detection 
LISSARD  Laboratory for Information System Security/Assurance Research 
and Development 
ML Machine Learning 
MLP  Multilayer Perceptron 
MRMR  Maximum Redundancy – Maximum Relevance 
NB  Naïve Bayes 
NBD Naïve Bayes Discretisation 
NBK  Naïve Bayes Kernel Density Estimation 
NBTree Naïve Bayes Tree 
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
NSA  National Security Agency 
OR Operations Research 
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OS Operating System 
OSI Open Systems Interconnection 
PC  Personal Computer 
PCA  Principal Component Analysis 
PDF  Probability Density Functions 
POP3 Post Office Protocol 
QoS Quality of Service 
RAM  Random Access Memory 
ROC  Receiver Operating Characteristic 
SFS  Sequential Forward Selection 
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 
SNR  Signal-to-Noise Ratio 
SVM Support Vector Machines 
SYN Synchronization 
TCP Transmission Control Protocol 
TN  True Negative 
TP  True Positive 
TPR  True Positive Rate 
UDP User Datagram Protocol 
US United States 
VBA  Visual Basic for Applications 
VPN Virtual Private Network 
 
104 
Appendix B: Original Feature List 
The original 248 feature set from Moore et al. [6]. 
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Appendix C: MATLAB Code for Neural Network Processing 
The following code was generated from the MATLAB neural network tool, and then 
modified by CPT James Jablonski and Maj Kristy Moore for use with this thesis research. 
function [targets, netouts, removed,overalltrue ,cmconfuse, timevar] = 
netsnr1outputtf_Moore1( Data,attempts,doSNR,usegpu, trainmodeinput ) 
 
%This function creates a Neural Network and performs SNR on a given data set 
% The Data must include rows of exemplars and columns of features. 
% This function Assumes data labels are in column 1 and parses them into the proper 
form for NN training 
% 
%Data = Data inputs 
%num attempts = Number of iterations of training (will return the net with the least 
cross-entropy)  
%doSNR = 0 don't perform SNR on data end on full feature set. else=DO 
%USEGPU = 0 don't use GPU.  1= use gpu with PURELIN transfer function. 
%train = type of training for the neural net; use 1 for trainscg, 2 for 
%trainbr, 3 traingdm, 4 traingda, 5 traincgp, 6 traingcgf, 7 trainbfg, %8traincgb, 9 
traingdx, 10 trainlm, 11 trainoss, or 12 trainrp (this %could change to a for loop that 
cycles through these in the future) 
  
%Based on the function input, choose which training algorithm to use 
trainingmodes = {'trainscg';'trainbr';'traingdm';'traingda';'traincgp';'traincgf';... 
'trainbfg';'traincgb';'traingdx'; 'trainlm';'trainoss';'traingrp'}; 
 
%trainingmodes = cellstr(trainingmodelist); 
trainmodefunc = trainingmodes(trainmodeinput); 
  
%the number of hidden nodes in the structure 
numhidden = [10 20 30 40 50]; 
  
for b =1:length(numhidden) %Loop through running with a different node structure each 
time 
     
    %start the stopwatch to track how long the processing takes 
    tic 
  
    %create the save name for this run 
    trainmodename = char(trainmodefunc); 
    savename = strcat(inputname(1),'_',num2str(numhidden(b)), ... 
'_',num2str(attempts),'_',trainmodename); 
    mkdir(savename); 
    currentfolder = pwd; 
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    savepath = fullfile(currentfolder,savename); 
     
    %count the number of classes 
    classvalues = unique(Data(:,1)); 
    numclasses = length(classvalues); 
     
    %See if 0 is a class 
    if any(classvalues)==0 
        n = 0; 
    else 
        n = 1; 
    end 
     
    %allocate size for datakey vector 
    %if there are 2 classes, say (0,1) then we only need 1 datakey %column 
    if numclasses == 2 && n == 0 
        datakeys = zeros(length(Data),1); 
    else 
        datakeys = zeros(length(Data),numclasses); 
    end 
     
    for i=1:length(Data(:,1)) %go through the first column 
        %check for 0,1 class which can be considered 1 class 
        if numclasses == 2 && n == 0 
            if Data(i,1) ~= 0 
                datakeys(i,1) = 1; %for whatever the other class value is 
            end 
        else 
            for j=1:numclasses %cycle through the class values 
                if Data(i,1)==classvalues(j) 
                    if n == 0 
                        datakeys(i,j+1)=1; %need a column for the zero values 
                    else 
                        datakeys(i,j)=1; %need columns only for class values 
                    end 
                end 
            end 
        end 
    end 
     
    %chop off first column (class) 
    data = Data(:,2:size(Data,2)); 
     
    %standardize my data 
    meanV = repmat(mean(data),length(data),1); %feature means vector 
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    stdev = repmat(std(data),length(data),1);  %prepare vector of %feature stdev 
     
    %sub mean to center 
    data = data - meanV; 
     
    %divide by std's 
    data = data./stdev; 
     
    %add noise vector 
    data = [rand(length(data),1),data]; 
     
    %set up the neural nets input and output 
    input = data; 
    output = datakeys; 
     
    % "remember" removed feature (for SNR)- bookkeeping 
    featuresremaining = 1:size(data,2); 
     
    snrs = zeros(size(data,2),size(data,2)); %a place to store all %SNR's 
     
    %Loop through creating several nets, then pick the best one 
    %then select fewer features using SNR 
     
    for z = 1:(size(data,2)-1);   %iterate through all features until 2 %are left (includes 
noise) 
        nets = {};    %create the cell array to store the nets 
        perfs = [];   %create the array to store the performance values 
         
        %if not doing the SNR feature removal then this loop only happens once 
        if doSNR == 0 
            z = size(data,2)-1; 
        end 
         
        %neural network requires them to be transposed 
        inputs = input'; 
        targets = output'; 
         
        %set up the network 
        net = patternnet(numhidden(b)); 
         
        %Loop through all desired attempts at creating nets 
        for k = 1:attempts 
             
            %Initialize network weights and biases after 1st run (initialized on net creation) 
            if k > 1 
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                net = init(net); 
            end 
             
            % Pre/Post functions 
            net.inputs{1}.processFcns = {'mapminmax','removeconstantrows'}; 
%,'removeconstantrows' 
            net.outputs{1}.processFcns = {'removeconstantrows'};  
%'removeconstantrows' 
             
            %Specifiy 'logsig' or 'purelin'  the transfer function at each layer 
            if usegpu==1 
                net.layers{1}.transferFcn = 'purelin'; 
                net.layers{2}.transferFcn = 'purelin'; 
            else 
                net.layers{1}.transferFcn = 'logsig'; 
                net.layers{2}.transferFcn = 'logsig'; 
            end 
             
            % Data manipulations 
            net.divideFcn = 'dividerand';  %divide up the data randomly 
            net.divideMode = 'sample';  % Divide by sample 
            net.divideParam.trainRatio = 70/100; %70% for training 
            net.divideParam.valRatio = 15/100; %15% for validation 
            net.divideParam.testRatio = 15/100; %15% for testing 
             
            %  help nntrain 
            net.trainFcn = trainmodename;  % Selected training mode from above 
            net.trainParam.epochs = 500; % Specify training epochs 
            net.trainParam.time = 300;   % Specify max training time 
            net.trainParam.goal = .005; % Specify training error goal def .005 
            net.trainParam.showWindow = 1;  % 0 = Don't show the training GUI 
            net.trainParam.max_fail = 10; %number of validation failures 
             
            % Choose a Performance Function 
            % For a list of all performance functions type: help nnperformance 
            net.performFcn = 'crossentropy';  % Cross-Entropy 
             
            % train 
            if usegpu==1 
                [net,tr] = train(net,inputs,targets,'useGPU','yes'); 
            else 
                [net,tr] = train(net,inputs,targets); 
            end 
             
            %run it 
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            outputs = net(inputs); 
             
            %get performance data from the network created 
            errors = gsubtract(targets,outputs); 
            performance = perform(net,targets,outputs); 
            perfs(k,1)=performance; %record crossentropys 
            nets{k,1}=net; 
             
        end 
         
        [v,I]=min(perfs); %find index of best net by crossentropy 
         
        perfsout(z) = v; 
         
        outputs = nets{I,1}(inputs); % get outputs from best net 
        NetOutputs{z} = outputs; %track the best outputs 
        netout=nets{I,1}; 
        netouts{z}=netout; 
         
        %Get the confusion matrix information and store it 
        %Am not currently using the ind - can change later if needed 
        [c,cm,ind,per] = confusion(targets, outputs); 
        perfconfuse{z} = per; 
        cmconfuse{z} = cm; 
         
        %Overall classification accuracy 
        overalltrue(z)=1-c 
         
        %Get the ROC Curve data with posclass for each class level 
        [tpr, fpr, thresholds] = roc(targets, outputs); 
        tprout{z} = tpr; 
        fprout{z} = fpr; 
        thresholdsout{z} = thresholds; 
        rocInfo{z} = {tprout{z}, fprout{z}, thresholdsout{z}}; 
         
        %convert the iteration number to a string 
        num = num2str(z); 
         
        %plot the ROC curves 
        figure(z), plotroc(targets,outputs); 
        %create the save name for the ROC curves 
        ROC_curves_savename = strcat('ROCCurve_',savename,'(',num,').fig'); 
        %save the figure then close it 
        savefig(fullfile(savepath,ROC_curves_savename)); 
        close(gcf) 
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        %plot the performance 
        figure(z), plotperform(tr); 
        %create the save name for the performance curves 
        perform_curves_savename = strcat('PerformCurve_',savename,'(',num,').fig'); 
        %save the figure then close it 
        savefig(fullfile(savepath,perform_curves_savename)); 
        close(gcf) 
         
        %plot the training state 
        figure(z), plottrainstate(tr); 
        %create the save name for the train state plot 
        trainstate_savename = strcat('TrainState_',savename,'(',num,').fig'); 
        %save the figure then close it 
        savefig(fullfile(savepath,trainstate_savename)); 
        close(gcf) 
         
        %plot the error history 
        figure(z), ploterrhist(errors,'bins',20); 
        %create the save name for the error history 
        ErrHistory_savename = strcat('ErrHistory_',savename,'(',num,').fig'); 
        %save the figure then close it 
        savefig(fullfile(savepath,ErrHistory_savename)); 
        close(gcf) 
         
        %plot the final confusion matrix 
        figure(z), plotconfusion(targets,outputs); 
        %create the save name for the figure 
        confusion_plot_savename = strcat('ConfusionPlot_',savename,'(',num,').fig'); 
        %save the figure then close it 
        savefig(fullfile(savepath,confusion_plot_savename)); 
        close(gcf) 
         
        if doSNR == 1 
            %do the SNR check 
            snr = []; 
            wts = net.IW{1,1}; %create the weights for SNR 
            dim = size(wts); 
            noise = wts(:,1)'*wts(:,1); 
            for j = 2:dim(2) %calculate the SNR values 
                snr(j)=10*log10((wts(:,j)'*wts(:,j))/noise); 
            end 
             
            %create the array for bookkeeping 
            row = zeros(1,size(snrs,2)); 
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            %adjust the array of features remaining 
            for d = 1:length(snr) 
                index = featuresremaining(d); 
                row(1,index) = row(1,index)+snr(d); 
            end 
             
            snrs(z,:) = row; 
             
            %plot the features remaining vs. their snrs 
            figure(z), bar(featuresremaining,snr); 
            bar_plot_savename = strcat('SNR_BarPlot_',savename,'(',num,').fig'); 
            %save the figure then close it 
            savefig(fullfile(savepath,bar_plot_savename)); 
            close(gcf) 
             
            snr(1)=100; %make sure I don't remove noise 
             
            %Remove Least significant Features in Order of SNR loop %through trials again 
             
            [val, I]=min(snr); %index of smallest SNR = I 
             
            %remove index of smallest feature from featuresremaining 
            removed(z)=featuresremaining(I); 
             
            %check to see if end of array 
            if I==size(featuresremaining,2) 
                featuresremaining=featuresremaining(:,1:I-1); 
            else 
                featuresremaining=[featuresremaining(:,1:I-
1),featuresremaining(:,I+1:dim(2))]; 
            end 
             
            %remove smallest feature; check to see if end of array 
            if I==dim(2) 
                input=input(:,1:I-1); 
            else 
                input=[input(:,1:I-1),input(:,I+1:dim(2))]; 
            end 
        end 
    end 
     
    %stop the timer 
    timevar = toc; 
     
    %save the workspace and its associated variables 
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    saveworkspace = strcat(savename, '.mat'); 
    save(saveworkspace)  
     
end 
  
end 
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